People v. Rosal
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The accused, Anunciacion Rosal, became a widow on June 29, 1925. On August 19, 1925, she contracted a second marriage with Justino Velasco, which was within 301 days from the death of her first husband, Guillermo Rabe. Procedural History: The prosecution filed a complaint for violation of Article 476 of the Penal Code. The defense filed a demurrer, arguing that the charge did not constitute a crime because Article 476 of the Penal Code, being a penal sanction of Article 45 of the Civil Code, was not applicable due to the suspension of Title 4 of the Civil Code. The Court of First Instance sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case. The Petition: The prosecution appealed the dismissal order to the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether Article 476 of the Penal Code is still in force despite the suspension of Title 4 of Book 1 of the Civil Code. Whether contracting a second marriage within 301 days from the death of the first husband constitutes a crime under Article 476 of the Penal Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court revoked the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. It held that Article 476 of the Penal Code is in force and that contracting a second marriage within 301 days from the death of the first husband is punishable.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether Article 476 of the Penal Code is still in force: The Court held that Article 476 of the Penal Code was already in force in the Philippine Islands before the promulgation of the Civil Code. Therefore, its existence is not dependent on the provisions of the Civil Code. The suspension of Title 4 of the Civil Code, which includes Article 45, cannot legally affect the provisions of the Penal Code under consideration. The Penal Code provision serves the purpose of preventing doubtful paternity and thus a marriage contracted in violation of its provisions is punishable. The fact that General Orders No. 68 does not make such a marriage void or voidable does not mean Article 476 has been repealed; rather, the widow contracting such a marriage is criminally liable notwithstanding the validity of the marriage itself. Furthermore, the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Section 333, paragraph 3, establishes a conclusive presumption of legitimacy if a child is born within 300 days following the dissolution of a marriage. Without the penal sanction of Article 476, this presumption could lead to inconsistent effects, where a child could be presumed legitimate of both the deceased husband and the new husband, which the penal law aims to prevent. On whether contracting a second marriage within 301 days from the death of the first husband constitutes a crime: The Court affirmed that Article 476 of the Penal Code imposes a punishment upon a widow who marries before 301 days have elapsed from the death of her husband. This prohibition is in harmony with other legal provisions and is intended to prevent confusion in connection with filiation and paternity, as the widow might have conceived by her late husband. The case of United States vs. Dulay (10 Phil., 302) was cited as indirectly supporting this interpretation. Therefore, the act described in the complaint constitutes a crime.
Main Doctrine
Article 476 of the Penal Code, penalizing a widow who contracts a second marriage within 301 days from the death of her first husband, remains in force despite the suspension of Title 4 of Book 1 of the Civil Code, as the Penal Code provision is not dependent on the Civil Code for its existence and serves a distinct public policy of preventing confusion in filiation and paternity.