Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the validity of numerous appointments made by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the period leading up to the May 2010 presidential elections. These appointments, made by the outgoing administration, were subsequently recalled and revoked by the incoming administration of President Benigno S. Aquino III through Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2), which declared them as "midnight appointments" made in violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional provision prohibits the President from making appointments, except for temporary ones in executive positions when vacancies would prejudice public service or endanger public safety, during the two months immediately preceding the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President's term. 2. Procedural History: Following the issuance of EO 2, several individuals who received appointments from the previous administration challenged its constitutionality. These challenges were consolidated before the Supreme Court, which, by Resolution dated January 31, 2012, referred the petitions and related motions to the Court of Appeals (CA) for further proceedings and reception of evidence. The CA, in separate decisions, upheld the constitutionality of EO 2 but referred the evaluation of specific appointments back to the Office of the President in some cases, while deeming others as validly revoked midnight appointments. The petitioners, dissatisfied with the CA's rulings, elevated their cases to the Supreme Court through petitions for review on certiorari and petitions for certiorari. 3. The Petition: The consolidated petitions before the Supreme Court challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2, specifically Section 1(a), which defines midnight appointments to include those made before March 11, 2010, but where the appointee accepted, took an oath, or assumed office on or after March 11, 2010. Petitioners argue that the constitutional ban on appointments under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies only to the President's act of making an appointment, not to the subsequent actions of the appointee. They contend that their appointments were complete upon signing and issuance before the ban, and subsequent acceptance or oath-taking should not invalidate them. They also argue that EO 2 unduly expands the scope of the constitutional prohibition and that not all midnight appointments are inherently invalid, requiring individual assessment. The petitions seek the nullification of EO 2 and the reinstatement of their appointments.
Issue(s)
Whether the appointments made by PGMA were 'midnight appointments' within the meaning of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, and the constitutionality of EO 2's definition of 'midnight appointments'. Whether the petitioners' appointments were valid and should be upheld, considering the interpretation of 'appointment' under Section 15, Article VII, and the role of the Malacañang Records Office (MRO) and transmittal. Whether the petitioners' appointments were validly made and released before the ban, despite the void nature of EO 2's expanded definition. Whether the petitioners' right to security of tenure was violated, considering the appointments were declared void from the beginning.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petitions in G.R. Nos. 203372, 206290, and 212030, and dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 209138. The appointments of all petitioners were declared VOID. Executive Order No. 2 dated July 30, 2010, was declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the appointments were 'midnight appointments' and the constitutionality of EO 2: The Court clarified that Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution prohibits the President from making appointments during the two months immediately preceding the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term. This prohibition is directed at the President's executive act of appointing, which includes the signing, issuance, and release of the appointment paper. The Court held that EO 2's definition of midnight appointments, which included acts of acceptance, oath-taking, or assumption of office by the appointee after the ban, unduly expanded the constitutional prohibition. The Court reiterated that for an appointment to be valid, it must be made outside the prohibited period or fall under the exception. The Court found that the petitioners failed to prove that their appointment papers were issued and released before the ban, and in fact, admitted to taking their oaths of office during the ban. Therefore, their appointments were considered void for violating Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. On the validity of the appointments, the interpretation of 'appointment' under Section 15, Article VII, and the role of the Malacañang Records Office (MRO) and transmittal: The Court distinguished between an appointment as an 'executive act' and an 'appointment as a process.' It held that Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution limits the President's appointing power, which is an executive act. The Court reasoned that the Constitution prohibits the President from 'making appointments,' not from the entire process which includes the appointee's actions. Therefore, the appointee's acceptance, oath, or assumption of office, even if occurring after the ban, does not invalidate an appointment if the President's act of appointing (signing, issuance, release) was completed before the ban. The Court found that EO 2's inclusion of the appointee's subsequent acts as part of the prohibited 'making of appointments' was an unwarranted expansion of the constitutional provision. The Court emphasized that the release of an appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act signifying the President's intent of issuance. However, it clarified that coursing an appointment through the MRO is not fatal; the President can cause the issuance and release of an appointment paper without the MRO, provided the date of actual issuance or release can be established with reasonable certainty. The Court noted that in several petitioners' cases, the appointment papers were either received by the MRO long after the ban or their actual issuance dates could not be reliably established, thus failing to prove they were made before the ban. On the validity of the appointments and the void nature of EO 2's expanded definition: While the Court declared the specific phrase in EO 2 expanding the definition of 'midnight appointments' unconstitutional, it maintained that the core prohibition under Section 15, Article VII remains. The petitioners failed to demonstrate that their appointments were validly made and released before the ban. The Court found that the dates on their appointment papers and transmittal letters did not conclusively prove issuance and release before the ban, and their oaths of office were taken during the ban. Consequently, their appointments were declared void for violating the constitutional prohibition. On the petitioners' right to security of tenure: The Court held that petitioners could not claim a violation of their right to security of tenure because their appointments were declared void from the beginning for being unconstitutional. An appointment made in violation of the Constitution is a nullity, and no right to security of tenure attaches to a void appointment.
Main Doctrine
Executive Order No. 2, which defined 'midnight appointments' to include those where the appointee accepted, took an oath, or assumed office after March 11, 2010, even if the appointment paper bore a date prior to March 11, 2010, was declared unconstitutional for unduly expanding the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. The constitutional ban applies to the President's act of making the appointment (signing, issuance, and release), not to the appointee's subsequent actions, as these are beyond the President's control and do not constitute the 'making' of an appointment by the President.