Inocencio v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Francisco T. Inocencio was an employee of Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) from 1978 to 1998, eventually becoming manager of the Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Services Department Cash Management Division. A special audit conducted by Liza Sarao, an audit officer, investigated reported anomalous transactions by petitioner and a branch trade officer, Ma. Milagros T. Clemente. Sarao alleged that Clemente fraudulently credited P1,150,634.74 to a relative's account and P1,262,774.50 to petitioner's FEBTC account through three transactions. Petitioner allegedly withdrew the entire amount. The funding for petitioner's account allegedly came from unauthorized terminations of other clients' placements. Petitioner claimed he only learned of the cases in 1998 while in the US, denied knowledge of Clemente's transactions, and asserted the money in his account was from a piggery business he co-owned with Clemente and others. He admitted delivering pre-signed blank checks to Clemente for their business. Procedural History: Five informations charging theft in conspiracy with Clemente were filed against petitioner. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, convicted petitioner of two counts of theft (Criminal Case Nos. MC 99-1456 and MC 99-1457), sentencing him to 12 years and 1 day to 20 years imprisonment and to indemnify FEBTC P1,262,774.50 for MC 99-1456 and P450,000.00 for MC 99-1457. He was acquitted in three other cases. The RTC found the elements of theft proven by circumstantial evidence, noting petitioner's possession of funds taken in a wrongful act and his failure to ascribe ill motives to prosecution witnesses. The Court of Appeals (CA) modified the RTC decision, convicting petitioner only in Criminal Case No. MC 99-1456, sentencing him to 6 years to 20 years imprisonment and to indemnify FEBTC P1,262,774.50, while acquitting him in Criminal Case No. MC 99-1457. The CA found that petitioner admitted ownership of the accounts where the funds were deposited and withdrawn, and that he issued checks for the withdrawal. The CA agreed with the RTC that circumstantial evidence sufficiently proved petitioner's guilt in MC 99-1456. The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Petition: Petitioner assails the CA decision and resolution, arguing that the CA erred in deciding contrary to doctrines on venue and the personal nature of criminal liability absent conspiracy. He also questions the CA's holding that the circumstances ruled out his innocence, claiming the venue was not proven to be Mandaluyong City, and that as the sole accused, he could not be convicted of acts committed by Clemente. He also argued that no evidence showed he physically withdrew the money, and that Sarao admitted the possibility of funds being credited without his knowledge.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in deciding contrary to the doctrines that venue in a criminal case is jurisdictional and that criminal liability, absent any conspiracy, is purely personal. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the circumstances surrounding the instant case should rule out the petitioner's innocence. Whether the Information sufficiently alleged conspiracy as a mode of committing the crime.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION directing the payment of legal interest on the indemnity due to FEBTC. Petitioner Francisco T. Inocencio is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft in Criminal Case No. MC 99-1456 and ordered to indemnify Far East Bank and Trust Company the amount of P1,262,774.50, subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the resolution until full satisfaction.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of venue and the personal nature of criminal liability: The Court found no merit in the petitioner's arguments regarding venue, stating that the CA had already amply disposed of the matter. Regarding the personal nature of criminal liability, the Court reiterated that conspiracy, when alleged as a mode of committing the crime, does not require the same degree of particularity as when it is charged as a crime itself. The Information in Criminal Case No. MC 99-1456 was deemed sufficient as it alleged that the petitioner, with Clemente, took FEBTC's money through fraudulent transfers and withdrawals, thereby conveying a unity of purpose. The non-inclusion of Clemente in the Information did not invalidate it, as conspiracy was not charged as a separate crime but as a means to incur criminal liability. On whether the circumstances ruled out his innocence: The Court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. MC 99-1456. The Court noted that petitioner, as a bank officer, could be presumed to know banking procedures and liabilities, yet he delivered blank checks to Clemente and did not inquire about their status or his account. His claim of not receiving bank statements or original checks was not given credence, as bank procedures dictate their return to account holders. Furthermore, his inconsistent testimonies regarding the piggery business—claiming it lasted only three months but later alleging receipt of profits over two years later—failed to lend credibility to his defense. The Court emphasized that denials unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving. On the sufficiency of the Information alleging conspiracy: The Court held that the Information in Criminal Case No. MC 99-1456 adequately complied with the requirements for alleging conspiracy as a mode of committing the crime. Although the words "conspire" or "confederated" were not explicitly used, the Information clearly alleged that the petitioner and Clemente were united in their purpose of fraudulently taking FEBTC's money. This allegation enabled the petitioner to prepare his defense. The Court cited Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan to support the principle that an information alleging conspiracy can stand even if only one person is charged, as long as conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense but merely the mode of commission.
Main Doctrine
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. An information alleging conspiracy as a mode of committing the crime is sufficient even if only one person is charged, provided it adequately conveys that the accused and another were united in purpose.