Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Casimiro

G.R. No. 206866 · 2015-09-02 · J. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Ethics
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), acting as statutory receiver for Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI) after its closure by the BSP Monetary Board, filed a criminal complaint against Fidel C. Cu (owner of BDBI), Carmelita B. Zate (Chairman/President of BDBI), and Mary Lou S. Apelo (former BSP employee who examined BDBI's books). The complaint alleged Direct Bribery, Corruption of Public Officials under the Revised Penal Code, and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Arsenia T. Gomez, a former BDBI employee, executed an affidavit detailing an alleged scheme where Cu instructed her to deposit a total of ₱140,000.00 to Apelo's bank account as "professional fees." These deposits were allegedly made on November 16, 2006 (₱30,000.00), April 20, 2007 (₱60,000.00), and October 3, 2007 (₱50,000.00). Gomez further alleged that Apelo provided Cu with "advance warning" of surprise BSP examinations, enabling Cu to manipulate BDBI's books and cash on hand to conceal irregularities. The disbursements to Apelo were allegedly covered up in BDBI's books as "Other Cash Items" and later regularized by including them in other accounts. Procedural History: The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause. The Ombudsman reasoned that there was no proof Apelo withdrew the deposited amounts, thus it could not be certain she received monetary consideration for advance information. The Ombudsman denied PDIC's motion for reconsideration, further discrediting Gomez's affidavit regarding the "advance warnings" as hearsay. The Petition: PDIC filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Ombudsman's dismissal for grave abuse of discretion.

Issue(s)

Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict private respondents of the crimes charged. Whether hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations; and whether probable cause existed based on the evidence presented.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious. The Resolution dated January 24, 2012, and the Order dated October 29, 2012, of the Office of the Ombudsman are reversed and set aside. The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to issue the proper resolution to indict private respondents Fidel C. Cu, Carmelita B. Zate, and Mary Lou S. Apelo.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman: The Court held that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. While the Court generally refrains from interfering with the Ombudsman's discretion in determining probable cause, it can review such actions when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion, which implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. The Court emphasized that probable cause requires only facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof; it does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt or even clear and convincing evidence. The preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode to discover if there is a reasonable basis to believe a crime was committed and the accused is responsible, not the occasion for a full display of the prosecution's evidence. On the admissibility of hearsay evidence in preliminary investigations; and whether probable cause existed based on the evidence presented: The Court found it erroneous for the Ombudsman to disallow Gomez's affidavit solely on the ground of being hearsay. The Court reiterated its pronouncement in Estrada v. Ombudsman and cited United States v. Ventresca to establish that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations. Such investigations are preliminary and do not adjudicate rights and obligations. The crucial factor is whether there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay, which exists if the person making the statement is credible. In this case, Gomez, as a former high-ranking officer of BDBI, was privy to delicate transactions, providing a substantial basis to credit her statements, even if they were hearsay. The validity of defenses and admissibility of evidence are better ventilated during trial proper. The Court found that the allegations in Gomez's affidavit, detailing the scheme of advance warnings, manipulation of books, and payments to Apelo as "professional fees," coupled with the deposit slips as supporting evidence, established a prima facie case. Cu and Zate offered mere denials, and Apelo failed to file a counter-affidavit, thus failing to debunk the charges. The Court concluded that these facts were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime had been committed and that the respondents were probably guilty, warranting their indictment and defense in a full-blown trial.

Main Doctrine

The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal complaint for lack of probable cause when the evidence presented, including hearsay statements with substantial basis for crediting them, established a prima facie case against the respondents, as the technical rules of evidence are not strictly applied in preliminary investigations.

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