People v. Basilonia
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and John Basilonia were convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 1773 and 1775. In Criminal Case No. 1773, they were found guilty as principals for the murder of Atty. Isagani Roblete, receiving an indeterminate sentence and ordered to pay civil indemnity. In Criminal Case No. 1775, John Basilonia was found guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced accordingly. Petitioners were acquitted in Criminal Case No. 1774 for illegal possession of a firearm. Procedural History: Following the promulgation of the decision on June 19, 1987, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, which was granted. However, their appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on January 23, 1989, for failure to file their brief. The resolution was entered on September 18, 1989, and the records were remanded to the trial court. Nearly twenty years later, on May 11, 2009, the private respondent, claiming to be the son of the deceased victim, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment. The trial court granted this motion on December 3, 2009, and denied the motion for reconsideration on January 4, 2010. Subsequently, the bail bonds were ordered forfeited, and a writ of execution was issued. The Petition: This case involves a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the applicability of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules in criminal cases, specifically whether a trial court has jurisdiction to grant a motion for execution filed almost twenty years after the entry of judgment. The petitioners argue that both the penalty of imprisonment and the civil liability have prescribed. The Supreme Court considered whether the penalty of imprisonment had prescribed, concluding it had not as the petitioners never evaded service of sentence by escaping from confinement. However, regarding the civil liability, the Court found that it had been extinguished due to the failure to file for execution by motion within five years or by independent action within ten years, as prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Civil Code, and no justifiable exceptions were present.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting a motion for execution of judgment filed almost twenty (20) years after the judgment became final and executory. Whether the penalty of imprisonment imposed on the petitioners has prescribed. Whether the civil liability arising from the crime committed has been extinguished by prescription.
Ruling
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition for certiorari. The Orders dated December 3, 2009, and January 4, 2010, of the RTC were AFFIRMED IN PART only insofar as the execution of the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. The case was REMANDED to the trial court for the immediate issuance of a mittimus. The Office of the Court Administrator was directed to investigate the delay in the execution of the judgment.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court ruled that the prescription of the penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence commences to run only when the culprit evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment. In this case, the petitioners were never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment. Therefore, the prescription of the penalty of imprisonment did not run in their favor, and the respondent trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the motion for execution and granting it with respect to the imprisonment aspect. The Court reiterated the rulings in Tanega v. Masakayan, et al. and Del Castillo v. Hon. Torrecampo, emphasizing that 'escape' in legal parlance means unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits of his custody, and one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. The Court emphasized that once a judgment of conviction becomes final and executory, the trial court has the ministerial duty to immediately execute the penalty of imprisonment. A motion to execute judgment is not necessary. The Court criticized the lower court for its failure to promptly execute the judgment, reminding judges of their duty to issue commitment orders without delay. The Court also noted that while the civil liability is subject to prescription, the penalty of imprisonment is not, in this case, due to the petitioners' failure to serve their sentence. On the issue of prescription of penalty of imprisonment: (Covered in the first ratio point, addressing grave abuse of discretion, as the lack of prescription of penalty is a key reason for finding no grave abuse of discretion.) On the issue of extinction of civil liability: The Court held that the civil liability arising from the offense is distinct from the penalty and is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a final and executory judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from its entry, and thereafter, by an independent action before it is barred by the statute of limitations, which is ten (10) years under Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code. In this case, the heirs of Atty. Roblete did not file a motion for execution within the five-year period nor an action to revive the judgment within the ten-year period. The Court found no persuasive or compelling reason to warrant the exercise of equity jurisdiction, as the delay was not caused by the petitioners nor was it beyond the control of the prevailing party. The Court noted the inaction and indifference of the heirs, construing it as a waiver of their right to execute the civil aspect of the judgment. Therefore, the civil liability had been extinguished by prescription.
Main Doctrine
The prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence commences to run only when the culprit evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment. Civil liability arising from a crime, however, is subject to the rules on prescription of actions under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, specifically the five-year period for execution by motion and the ten-year period for execution by independent action, unless exceptions apply.