Re: Letter of Veloso
MODIFICATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Justice Angelita A. Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) served as a Commissioner of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) before her appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA). She requested that her years of service as an NLRC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity pay, arguing that the law grants NLRC Commissioners the same rank and salary as CA Justices. Procedural History: On June 16, 2015, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution (penned by Justice Arturo D. Brion) denying Justice Gacutan's request. The Court initially held that longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) is strictly for service rendered 'in the judiciary' and that the Court could not recognize service in the Executive branch for this purpose. Justice Gacutan subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration, adopting the dissenting opinions of Justices Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco from the original resolution. The Petition: Justice Gacutan moved for reconsideration, asserting that the grant of parity in salary and benefits under Article 216 of the Labor Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 9347) should include longevity pay. She argued that longevity pay is a component of 'salary' and that recognizing her past service would be a reward for her lifelong public service. She contended that granting the request is not judicial legislation but a recognition of justice and equity.
Issue(s)
Whether service as a Commissioner of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) should be included in the computation of longevity pay for a member of the Judiciary under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Ruling
The Supreme Court GRANTED the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court MODIFIED the Resolution dated June 16, 2015, and GRANTED Justice Gacutan's request that her services as NLRC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity pay, but reckoned only from August 26, 2006, the date Republic Act No. 9347 took effect.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Issue of Longevity Pay as Salary: The Court reasoned that under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, longevity pay is not a mere 'benefit' but forms part of the 'total salary' of the recipient. The law explicitly states that longevity pay is 'added' to the basic pay, and the resulting sum is referred to as the 'total salary.' Applying the principle of ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus (where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish), the term 'salary' in parity laws must include longevity pay. The Court emphasized that Congress is presumed to have known this definition when it enacted laws granting executive officials the 'same salary' as judges. Furthermore, the Court relied on the long-standing precedent in Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, which established that longevity pay becomes a vested right and part of the salary. The Court also noted that the Executive branch, through the Department of Justice (DOJ), has historically shared this contemporaneous construction. Finally, the Court held that since Republic Act No. 9347 granted NLRC Commissioners the same rank and salary as CA Justices starting August 26, 2006, Justice Gacutan's service from that date forward must be credited for her longevity pay computation.
Main Doctrine
The term 'salary' as used in Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) encompasses both the basic monthly pay and the longevity pay. Under the principle of 'equal in qualifications and equal in rank, equal in salaries and benefits received,' executive officials granted judicial parity by law are entitled to have their service in those executive positions credited for longevity pay. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to equalize compensation between the Judiciary and specific executive arms (like the National Labor Relations Commission or National Prosecution Service) to prevent the 'migratory effect' of legal professionals leaving the executive branch for the judiciary.