Hernandez v. Ocampo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Milagros Hernandez (Hernandez) alleged that she purchased two parcels of land in 1985 from Romeo Uy An (An), evidenced by a deed of sale, and has been in continuous possession since then. She entrusted the registration of the titles to her son-in-law, who died before transferring them. Hernandez, residing in the US, was unaware of the non-registration. In 2002, she discovered that the titles were registered in the names of respondents Felicitas R. Mendoza (Mendoza) and Edwina Ocampo (Ocampo) via a deed of sale from An dated April 13, 1989. The lots were subsequently mortgaged to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) and Philippine Savings Bank (PSB), respectively. After extrajudicial foreclosure, the banks became the highest bidders, and new titles were issued in their names. PSB and Metrobank filed petitions for writs of possession, which were granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Hernandez filed a separate civil case for annulment of titles and sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement of the writs of possession. Procedural History: The RTC denied Hernandez's motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, ruling that the allegations of fraudulent registration were evidentiary and required trial. The RTC also noted that the banks relied on clean titles and that the issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial after the redemption period. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's denial, holding that Hernandez failed to prove a clear and unmistakable right and that the TCTs in the names of Ocampo and Mendoza were superior to Hernandez's deed of sale. The CA also invoked the principle of non-interference between co-equal courts. The Petition: Hernandez filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the writs of possession could not be enforced against her as she was not privy to the foreclosure proceedings and was in actual possession under an adverse claim, thus invoking her right to due process. She contended that the exception to the ministerial issuance of a writ of possession applies when a third party is in actual possession adversely.
Issue(s)
Whether the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Whether the issuance of the writs of possession against the mortgagors could be enjoined, considering that petitioner claims to be a third party in actual possession of the property under an adverse claim.
Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the writ of preliminary injunction: The Supreme Court held that the petition for review on certiorari is unmeritorious. The Court reiterated that a writ of possession is an order commanding the sheriff to place a person in possession of property. It may be issued in various proceedings, including extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. The purchaser or mortgagee can apply for a writ of possession either within the redemption period (with a bond) or after the lapse of the redemption period (without a bond). In the latter case, the issuance of the writ is a ministerial function. The Court emphasized that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is ministerial and cannot be enjoined, even by the filing of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding. On the issue of whether the issuance of the writs of possession could be enjoined due to third-party possession: The Supreme Court acknowledged the exception to the ministerial rule: when a third party is in actual possession of the property adversely to the judgment debtor. In such cases, the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be ex parte and non-adversarial, and a hearing is required to determine the nature of the possession. This exception is rooted in the principle of due process and Article 433 of the Civil Code, which presumes ownership from actual possession under claim of ownership, requiring judicial process for recovery. However, the Court found that in this case, the possession of the petitioner was uncertain and disputed. Both banks alleged they are mortgagees in good faith and conducted ocular inspections, finding the lots unoccupied. They also verified with government offices that the titles remained registered in the names of Ocampo and Mendoza without any annotations of encumbrances or adverse claims. Citing Gopiao v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., the Court ruled that there must be certainty of possession for the exception to apply. Since Hernandez's possession was questionable and not substantiated with sufficient evidence, the exception did not apply, and the issuance of the writs of possession remained ministerial. The Court also noted that Hernandez had already filed a separate action for annulment of title, which is the proper venue to litigate ownership claims. The denial of the injunction was also upheld on the ground that it would, in effect, dispose of the main case without trial.
Main Doctrine
The ministerial duty of a court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial when a third party is in actual possession of the property claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor, in which case a hearing is required to determine the nature of the possession. However, where the possession of the third party is uncertain or disputed, the exception does not apply, and the writ of possession remains ministerial.