Albano v. Ravanes
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent-spouses Mena and Roberto Ravanes are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Pasig City. Petitioners, heirs of Gamaliel Albano, purchased a house standing on approximately 35 square meters of the property in 1986. Petitioners leased the property from Mena with the agreement that they would vacate when the respondent-spouses' family needed it. In March 2000, respondent-spouses informed petitioners that their daughter Rowena needed the property for her conjugal home, but petitioners refused to vacate. Procedural History: Respondent-spouses filed an ejectment case against petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), citing Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 (BP 877) as ground for ejectment. The MeTC ruled in favor of the respondent-spouses, ordering petitioners to vacate and pay back rentals. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), on appeal, reversed the MeTC decision, dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence and denial of due process. The Court of Appeals (CA), in turn, reversed the RTC decision, reinstating the MeTC ruling. Petitioners then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment, alleging a new lease contract between petitioner Alexander Albano and respondent Roberto Ravanes as a supervening event. The CA denied this motion, holding that its decision had become final and executory. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial, which was also denied. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. The Petition: Petitioners seek to annul the CA Decision and Resolution, arguing that the CA erred in reversing the RTC's Decision, that the new lease contract constituted a supervening event, and that respondent-spouses failed to comply with Section 5(c) of BP 877.
Issue(s)
Whether the CA Decision is already final and executory. Whether the execution of the lease contract is a supervening event that will justify the stay of execution of the CA Decision. Whether the respondent-spouses complied with Section 5(c) of BP 877.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition. It held that the CA Decision had become final and executory due to petitioners' procedural missteps in filing a prohibited second motion for reconsideration, which did not toll the period to appeal. The Court also found that the execution of the lease contract was not a supervening event and was not a valid compromise agreement as it lacked the consent of all parties, particularly Mena Ravanes, and that the property was Mena's paraphernal property. Finally, the Court ruled that respondent-spouses had complied with the requirements of Section 5(c) of BP 877.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the CA Decision is already final and executory: The Supreme Court ruled that the CA Decision had become final and executory. Petitioners received the CA Decision on September 4, 2007. They filed a Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment on September 19, 2007, which the CA denied on February 20, 2008. This motion was deemed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this denial on March 7, 2008, which was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. The denial of this second motion for reconsideration on July 7, 2008, did not toll the period to appeal. Therefore, the 15-day period to file a petition for review should have been reckoned from the receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration (February 22, 2008), making the petition filed on August 28, 2008, out of time. The Court emphasized that a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited and does not have any legal effect on the period to appeal. On the issue of whether the execution of the lease contract is a supervening event: The Supreme Court held that the execution of the lease contract on September 10, 2007, was not a supervening event that would justify the stay of execution of the CA Decision. A supervening event must transpire after a judgment has become final and executory. In this case, the lease contract was executed before the CA Decision attained finality. Furthermore, the Court characterized the lease contract as an attempted compromise agreement, which is a contract to avoid or end litigation. However, it found the compromise invalid because it lacked the consent of all parties, specifically Mena Ravanes, who is the registered owner of the property. The Court also noted that the property was Mena's paraphernal property, and Roberto Ravanes had no authority to lease it without her consent, especially for a period exceeding one year. On the issue of whether the respondent-spouses complied with Section 5(c) of BP 877: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's finding that respondent-spouses complied with Section 5(c) of BP 877. Regarding the requirement that the owner/lessor does not own any other available residential unit, the Court clarified that the keyword is "available." While respondent-spouses owned other properties, they were occupied by tenants and thus not available for their daughter's use. Regarding the definite period of lease, the Court reiterated that a month-to-month lease, where rentals are paid monthly, is considered a lease with a definite period that expires at the end of each month, citing Article 1687 of the Civil Code. Lastly, concerning the 3-month notice requirement, the Court found that respondent-spouses had substantially complied by verbally informing petitioners as early as March 2000 and holding barangay conciliation meetings, even if the formal written notice was dated June 9, 2000, demanding vacation by July 13, 2000. The Court cited Garcia v. Court of Appeals to support the view that verbal demands and subsequent actions can satisfy the notice requirement.
Main Doctrine
A lease agreement without a fixed period, where rentals are paid monthly, is considered a month-to-month lease, which expires at the end of each month, giving the lessor the right to eject the lessee under Section 5(c) of BP 877 upon proper notice. A second motion for reconsideration is prohibited and does not toll the period to appeal, rendering the appellate court's decision final and executory.