Naga Centrum v. Orzales
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents, Spouses Ramon and Nenita Orzales, own a property in Naga City that became isolated after the petitioner, Naga Centrum, Inc., closed off Rizal Street, which was their primary access to Valentin Street. The Orzaleses alleged that when they acquired their property in 1965, Rizal Street was already an existing passageway. Naga Centrum, Inc. later acquired the property encompassing Rizal Street and, after evicting informal settlers, fenced off the area, restricting the Orzaleses' access to a limited schedule. This prompted the Orzaleses to seek a legal easement of right of way. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 22, granted the Orzaleses' petition for an easement of right of way, ordering Naga Centrum, Inc. to provide a 2-meter by 20-meter easement and to remove obstructions. The RTC found that the Orzaleses' property was indeed isolated, that the isolation was not their fault, and that the proposed easement was the least prejudicial and shortest route. Naga Centrum, Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), raising issues about the RTC judge's authority to decide the case and the merits of the easement. The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, finding no irregularity in the judge's authority and upholding the factual findings regarding the easement. Naga Centrum, Inc. then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied. The Petition: Naga Centrum, Inc. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the CA's decision and resolution. The petitioner argued that the RTC judge, as a pairing judge, lacked jurisdiction to render the decision, rendering it void. It also contended that the Orzaleses were at fault for their property's isolation by failing to secure a right of way from their seller and that the easement should have been sought from adjacent property owners, Felisa Estela and Aurora dela Cruz, who were allegedly indispensable parties not impleaded. The petitioner further argued that the chosen right of way was not the least prejudicial and that the CA erred in applying Article 650 of the Civil Code. Alternatively, the petitioner proposed mediation for an alternative outlet.
Issue(s)
Whether the pairing judge had jurisdiction to render the decision. Whether respondents have the right to demand a right of way. Assuming a right of way exists, whether the chosen route is the least prejudicial to the petitioner. Whether the Court of Appeals erroneously applied Article 650 of the Civil Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court found no irregularity in the pairing judge's assumption of the case, holding that petitioner was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction after actively participating in the proceedings and only raising the issue after an adverse decision. The Court also affirmed the existence of the legal easement of right of way, finding that all four requisites were met, and that the chosen route was the least prejudicial and shortest to the public highway.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction of the pairing judge: The Court found the CA's pronouncement regarding the pairing judge's authority to be sound. The pairing judge's decision was made after clarification from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and with the consent of the plaintiffs-appellees. The Court held that petitioner was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction, citing the principle that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief and then repudiate it after an adverse decision. Petitioner had multiple opportunities to object but failed to do so until after the unfavorable decision was rendered, demonstrating a "wait-and-see stance" that the Court would not countenance. The Court emphasized that active participation and failure to object to jurisdiction bars a party from later impugning it. On the right to demand a right of way: The Court found that all four requisites for a legal easement of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code were satisfied. First, the property was surrounded and lacked adequate outlet to a public highway, a fact not disputed by petitioner and confirmed by ocular inspections. Second, respondents expressed willingness to pay the proper indemnity. Third, the isolation was not due to respondents' own acts but to petitioner's closure of Rizal Street, which respondents had been using since 1965. Fourth, the easement was established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and where the distance to the public highway was shortest, considering the size and improvements on the surrounding properties. On whether the chosen right of way is the least prejudicial: The Court agreed with the lower courts that the easement should be established on petitioner's property. Petitioner's 1.9-hectare lot was considerably larger than the adjacent lots of Bernardo Tawagon (140 sq. m.), Aurora dela Cruz (116 sq. m.), and Felisa Estela (90 sq. m.). Imposing the easement on the smaller lots would have been more prejudicial, potentially rendering them useless, especially since these lots were already largely covered by two-storey concrete houses. The chosen route, along the boundary of petitioner's property, was also the shortest to Valentin Street and would cause minimal damage to the servient estate. On the alleged erroneous application of Article 650: The Court found no error in the application of Article 650. The evidence showed that the chosen route was indeed the shortest and least prejudicial. The Court reiterated that if the conditions of "least damage" and "shortest distance" do not concur in a single tenement, the way causing the least damage should be used. In this case, both conditions were met on petitioner's property. The Court also noted that petitioner's actions in blocking the established Rizal Street during the pendency of the case, despite knowing respondents' need for access, constituted bad faith and malice, which should not be rewarded.
Main Doctrine
A party cannot be allowed to influence and manipulate the courts' decisions by performing acts upon the disputed property during the pendency of the case which would allow it to achieve the objectives it desires. Furthermore, a party who actively participates in proceedings and only questions the jurisdiction after an adverse decision is estopped from doing so.