People v. Sandal
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The fiscal of Pampanga filed an information charging Cirilo Sandal with a violation of Section 45 of the Act of Congress of March 4, 1909, for allegedly entering Camp Stotsenburg, a military reservation, without permission and notwithstanding an express prohibition from the authorities. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Pampanga sustained a general demurrer to the information, holding that Section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code was not in force in the Philippine Islands. The Government appealed this decision. The Petition: The Attorney-General appealed, arguing that the lower court erred in holding that Section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code is not applicable to the Philippine Islands and in sustaining the demurrer.
Issue(s)
Whether Section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code of the United States is in force and applicable to the Philippine Islands. Whether the information filed against Cirilo Sandal sufficiently charged an offense under Section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order in so far as it declares the information insufficient but reversed it in so far as it orders the dismissal of the case and the cancellation of the bond. The case was remanded with directions to the fiscal to file a new information in conformity with the Court's opinion.
Ratio Decidendi
On the applicability of Section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code to the Philippine Islands: The Court held that Section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code is in force in the Philippine Islands. It reasoned that while Congressional legislation is not generally in force in the Philippines unless expressly declared, this rule primarily concerns territorial extension. Laws of inherent general application to particular subjects, especially those accompanying federal agencies like military establishments, are enforceable. The Court cited Tan Te vs. Bell (27 Phil. 354) where a similar principle was applied to a statute concerning military equipment. The purpose of Section 45 is to grant police power to authorities in charge of military reservations, and this power necessarily accompanies the military authorities wherever a reservation is lawfully established, irrespective of its location. The provision deals with a specific subject matter not conditioned by the place of the reservation. On the sufficiency of the information: The Court found that while Section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code is applicable, the information filed against Cirilo Sandal was demurrable for failing to state an offense. The statute penalizes the re-entry or being found within a military reservation after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to re-enter. The information merely alleged that the accused entered the reservation without permission and notwithstanding an express prohibition. It did not allege that he re-entered after being removed or ordered not to re-enter. Although a written notification to the accused ordering him not to re-enter was part of the record, the fiscal failed to charge a re-entrance after receipt of the notice, instead merely charging an entrance. The Court noted that the statute is commonly understood to prohibit re-entrance after removal or order not to re-enter, not a mere first entrance unless for an unlawful purpose not alleged here. Therefore, the information failed to charge an offense as defined by the statute.
Main Doctrine
A demurrer to an information for violation of Section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code should be sustained if the information fails to allege that the accused re-entered or was found within a military reservation after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to re-enter, even if it alleges that the accused entered without permission and notwithstanding express prohibition.