Ty-Delgado v. Pichay
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Respondent Philip A. Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel on September 16, 2008. The Supreme Court, in Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, sentenced him to pay a fine of P6,000.00 for each count and P1,000,000.00 in moral damages, in lieu of imprisonment. This decision became final and executory on June 1, 2009, and Pichay paid the imposed fines and damages on February 17, 2011. 2. Procedural History: On October 9, 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for Member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado filed a petition for disqualification with the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on February 18, 2013, arguing Pichay was ineligible due to his libel conviction. The Comelec dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Ty-Delgado then filed an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), reiterating Pichay's ineligibility. The HRET, in a decision dated March 18, 2015, and a subsequent resolution dated August 3, 2015, dismissed the quo warranto petition, declaring Pichay eligible. 3. The Petition: This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the HRET's decision and resolution. Petitioner Ty-Delgado argues that the HRET gravely abused its discretion by ruling that Pichay's libel conviction did not involve moral turpitude, contrary to Supreme Court findings. She contends that Pichay's conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude renders him ineligible to hold office and that his certificate of candidacy contained a false material representation of his eligibility. The petition further argues that Pichay should be deemed never to have been a candidate, and that Ty-Delgado, as the qualified candidate with the highest number of valid votes, should be declared the winner.
Issue(s)
Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the circumstances surrounding Respondent Pichay's conviction of libel did not show that moral turpitude is involved. Whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in failing to declare Respondent Pichay ineligible or disqualified from holding the position of Member of the House of Representatives by reason of his conviction of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; and whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in failing to declare that Respondent Pichay falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for congressman. Whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in failing to declare that Respondent Pichay should be deemed to have never become a candidate since his certificate of candidacy is void ab initio. Whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in failing to declare that since the petition for quo warranto questioned the validity of Respondent Pichay's candidacy, the jurisprudence on a "second placer" being proclaimed as winner should the certificate of candidacy of a "first placer" be cancelled, should apply; and whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion by failing to declare that Petitioner Delgado was the sole legitimate candidate for Member, House of Representatives of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur, thus she must be declared the rightful winner in the 2013 elections and must be made to assume the said position.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the HRET. It declared Respondent Philip A. Pichay ineligible to hold and serve the office of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado was declared the winner for the said position in the May 13, 2013 elections. The Decision was made immediately executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in ruling that Pichay's conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude: The Court found merit in the petition. A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. Moral turpitude encompasses acts contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals, including acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity. While not all crimes involve moral turpitude, crimes mala in se generally do, unlike crimes mala prohibita. The Court has previously listed libel as a crime involving moral turpitude. To be liable for libel, elements such as discreditable imputation, publication, identity of the defamed person, and malice must exist. Malice connotes ill will or spite and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm, requiring knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, the Court found Pichay liable for publishing libelous articles with reckless disregard of their falsity, thus acting with actual malice and committing an act contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. The Court emphasized that the Revised Penal Code holds the publisher responsible to the same extent as the author, and where the law does not distinguish, the Court should not distinguish. Pichay's participation as publisher was essential for the crime's consummation, and both author and publisher renege on their duties to fellowmen and society. The imposition of a fine does not negate the presence of moral turpitude, as established in previous cases where crimes penalized by fine still involved moral turpitude. On the issue of Pichay's ineligibility and false material representation: Having been convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude, Pichay is disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. This disqualification is removed only after five years from the service of the sentence. Since Pichay paid his fine on February 17, 2011, the five-year period would end on February 16, 2016. Therefore, he was disqualified to run for Member of the House of Representatives in the May 13, 2013 elections. His representation in his certificate of candidacy that he was eligible for elective public office constituted a false material representation, as he knew of his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. Such a misrepresentation is a ground for denying due course to or canceling a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. A candidate whose certificate of candidacy is void ab initio is deemed to have never been a candidate, and all votes cast for him are considered stray votes. On the application of Pichay's certificate of candidacy being void ab initio: Since Pichay's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio due to his ineligibility, he was never a valid candidate. Consequently, all votes cast for him were stray votes. On the application of "second placer" jurisprudence and declaring Petitioner Delgado the winner: The Court applied the principle that in such cases, the qualified candidate who garnered the highest number of valid votes should be declared the winner. Based on the records, petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado was the qualified candidate who received the highest number of valid votes for the position. Therefore, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to disqualify Pichay and in declaring him eligible. The Court reiterated that while the HRET is the sole judge of election contests for Members of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to review HRET decisions for grave abuse of discretion, particularly when the HRET disregards the law and settled precedents.
Main Doctrine
A conviction for libel, even if penalized by a fine, involves moral turpitude and renders a candidate disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. A false representation of eligibility in a certificate of candidacy due to such disqualification renders the certificate void ab initio, making the candidate never a candidate at all, and the votes cast for him stray votes.