People v. Agas
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: A complaint was filed charging Romulo Agas with housebreaking. The complaint alleged that on January 1, 1903, at daybreak, the defendant entered the house of Mariano Alburo and his family through a window, without consent and against the will of the owner, at a time when the doors and windows were closed. Procedural History: The defendant pleaded not guilty. The Court of First Instance of Cebu found him guilty and sentenced him to four months and one day of arresto mayor, a fine of one thousand five hundred pesetas, and costs. The defendant appealed. The Petition: The defendant appealed the judgment of the lower court, asserting his innocence of the crime of housebreaking.
Issue(s)
Whether the entry into the house of Mariano Alburo by Romulo Agas constituted the crime of housebreaking. Whether the element of entering "against the will of the occupant" was sufficiently proven.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and acquitted the defendant, Romulo Agas, with costs de oficio. The case was remanded to the court below.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the entry constituted housebreaking: The Court held that the facts presented did not constitute the crime of housebreaking. The principal element of housebreaking is that it must be committed against the will of the occupant. In this case, the evidence showed that Romulo Agas entered the house at the request of Concepcion Arrieta, who was living in the house and had illicit relations with him. Concepcion Arrieta opened the door for him, indicating consent rather than opposition to his entry. Therefore, the essential requisite of entering against the will of the occupant was absent. On the issue of whether the element of entering "against the will of the occupant" was sufficiently proven: The Court found that this element was not duly proven. Article 491 of the Penal Code punishes any private individual who enters another's dwelling against the will of the tenant thereof. The evidence demonstrated that the defendant entered the house with the consent of Concepcion Arrieta, one of the occupants, and not against her will. The fact that he was found lying with her on the same bed further supported the conclusion that his entry was consensual and facilitated by her. Mere presumption that the entrance was made against the owner's will is insufficient; it must be proven that the owner was opposed to it. The Court cited decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain to support this interpretation.
Main Doctrine
The crime of housebreaking requires that the entrance into another's dwelling be against the will of the occupant; entrance with the consent, express or implied, of an occupant, even without the owner's knowledge, does not constitute housebreaking.