Reyes v. Arches
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On November 21, 2005, Municipal Ordinance No. 357 of Bansalan, Davao del Sur prohibited the sale of firecrackers within the public market premises. On December 14, 2009, then Bansalan Mayor Edwin Granada Reyes approved a permit allowing vendors to sell firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market from December 21, 2009, to January 1, 2010. On December 27, 2009, a fire occurred at the market, causing extensive damage. Private respondent Paul Jocson Arches filed a complaint against Mayor Reyes for violating Municipal Ordinance No. 357 and allegedly causing the fire. Procedural History: The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao included Chief of Police Solomon Anore de Castilla, Fire Marshall Gil C. Andres, and Permits and Licensing Officer Designate Rita Potestas Domingo as respondents, as they recommended the approval of the mayor's permit. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated March 20, 2013, finding probable cause to indict Reyes, Domingo, de Castilla, and Andres for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). An Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman denied their motions for reconsideration. The Petition: Petitioner Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution and Memorandum, arguing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion as there was no legal basis for the finding of probable cause. He contended that the permit was issued based on long-standing practice, all vendors were treated similarly, and no unwarranted benefit was given. He also argued that his right to due process was violated because he was not furnished a copy of co-respondent Andres' affidavit, which he claimed was the basis for the charge.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against petitioner Edwin Granada Reyes for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Whether petitioner's right to due process was violated during the preliminary investigation.
Ruling
The Petition is DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman's March 20, 2013 Resolution and June 26, 2013 Memorandum are AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause: The Supreme Court reiterated its general policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's findings of probable cause, emphasizing that this is an executive function granted wide latitude by the Constitution and law. The Court stressed that disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings is insufficient to establish grave abuse of discretion, which requires a showing that the Ombudsman acted capriciously, whimsically, or in evasion of a positive duty. The Court found that the Ombudsman properly performed its duty by considering the evidence and determining the existence of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the offense was committed. The issuance of the mayor's permit in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 357 and despite the lack of a Fire Safety Inspection Certificate (FSIC) was deemed to have given unwarranted benefit to the firecracker vendors, and the act was found to be tainted with bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court noted that the Ombudsman sufficiently explained how the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 were met, including the unwarranted benefit, and the bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, citing the respondents' awareness of the ordinance and the fire risk. On the issue of violation of due process: The Supreme Court held that a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not subject to the same stringent due process requirements. The Court clarified that while a respondent has the right to examine evidence submitted by the complainant, there is no law or rule requiring the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of co-respondents. The Court cited Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman to support the principle that a respondent's access to evidence on record pertains to the complainant's evidence, not that of co-respondents. Therefore, petitioner's non-receipt of co-respondent Andres' affidavit did not violate his procedural rights during the preliminary investigation. The Court also affirmed that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, which petitioner had by filing a counter-affidavit.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court generally defers to the Ombudsman's findings of probable cause, as this is an executive function. Disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings does not automatically constitute grave abuse of discretion. A preliminary investigation is not subject to the same stringent due process requirements as a trial, and a respondent is not entitled to copies of co-respondents' counter-affidavits.