People v. Belen
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, a lawyer, filed a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr., before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City. The complaint was assigned to Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Ma. Victoria Sufiega-Lagman. After submitting affidavits, petitioner requested a clarificatory hearing. Without acting on the request, ACP Sufiega-Lagman dismissed the complaint. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify) and furnished copies to Nezer and the Office of the Secretary of Justice. The motion was received by the OCP of San Pablo City. Procedural History: ACP Sufiega-Lagman learned of the Omnibus Motion from Michael Belen, son of Nezer, and from OCP staff. She requested a copy. On September 20, 2004, ACP Sufiega-Lagman filed a criminal complaint for libel against petitioner based on the allegations in the Omnibus Motion. Due to the OCP's inhibition, the Regional State Prosecutor designated State Prosecutor II Jorge D. Baculi to investigate. On December 6, 2004, State Prosecutor Baculi found probable cause and filed an Information charging petitioner with libel. The trial court convicted petitioner of libel and sentenced him to pay a fine of ₱3,000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, and subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Petition: Petitioner sought review from the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in finding him guilty of libel due to the absence of the element of publication, in ruling that the privileged communication rule was inapplicable, and in relying on ordinary witnesses to show malicious imputations.
Issue(s)
Whether the element of publication is present in the filing and service of the Omnibus Motion. Whether the statements made in the Omnibus Motion are covered by the doctrine of absolutely privileged communication. Whether the testimonies of ordinary witnesses regarding the defamatory nature of the statements are admissible and sufficient, and the appropriateness of the penalty imposed.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification, increasing the fine to ₱6,000.00.
Ratio Decidendi
On the element of publication: The Court held that publication exists when the defamatory matter is made known to someone other than the person defamed. Petitioner's contention that he merely complied with the law on service and filing of pleadings is unavailing. The Omnibus Motion, even if in sealed envelopes, was filed with the OCP and copy furnished to Nezer and the Office of the Secretary of Justice. As a lawyer, petitioner is aware that such a motion becomes part of the public record. The Court reiterated that one is disputably presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act. The filing of the motion with the OCP created a strong probability that it would be read by third persons, specifically the OCP staff, before reaching the intended recipient. Furthermore, furnishing a copy to Michael Belen, the son and representative of the respondent in the estafa case, constituted publication as he is not an agent of ACP Sufiega-Lagman. The Court also clarified that Flores and Enseo, as mere administrative staff of the OCP, did not have a specific duty related to the subject matter of the motion, thus their reading of it constituted publication. On the applicability of absolutely privileged communication: The Court ruled that the statements in the Omnibus Motion were not absolutely privileged because they failed the test of relevancy. While statements in pleadings are generally privileged if relevant, the specific phrases used by petitioner, such as "manifest bias for 20,000 reasons," "moronic resolution," "intellectually infirm or stupid blind," and "a fraud and a quack bereft of any intellectual ability and mental honesty," were deemed scurrilous attacks on ACP Sufiega-Lagman's honor, reputation, and mental character. These statements were not material or pertinent to the prayers for reconsideration or disqualification, and no reasonable man could doubt their irrelevancy and impropriety. The Court emphasized that while lawyers are given latitude for pertinent comment, they must not use abusive or offensive language, and must conduct themselves with courtesy and fairness. On the reliance on ordinary witnesses and the penalty: The Court found no merit in petitioner's argument that the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of ordinary witnesses. These witnesses, having read the Omnibus Motion, were competent to testify on their understanding of the statements, which is relevant to determining their defamatory character. The trial court's own assessment of the statements as defamatory, imputing bribery and calling the prosecutor "idiot," "imbecile," and possessing "stupendous stupidity," was also considered. The Court modified the penalty, increasing the fine from ₱3,000.00 to ₱6,000.00, considering petitioner's status as a lawyer who used abusive language, the irrelevancy of the statements, the damage to the prosecutor's reputation and public confidence, and the lack of remorse.
Main Doctrine
Statements made in a motion for reconsideration during a preliminary investigation are not absolutely privileged if they are irrelevant, impertinent, and constitute scurrilous attacks on the person of the investigating prosecutor, thereby losing their character as privileged communication and constituting libel.