Feliciano v. Feliciano
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Benedicta Feliciano's will established a trust for her nephew and nieces, Luis, Melchora, and Elisa Feliciano y Camahort, to take effect upon their emancipation or marriage. The will appointed Ines Feliciano as the first trustee, with subsequent trustees named. The trust was intended to manage the property until the beneficiaries were capable of managing their own affairs, with specific instructions regarding the income and the disposition of a particular apartment house and land. Procedural History: Ines Feliciano assumed her duties as trustee. Upon the beneficiaries reaching majority, they petitioned the court to terminate the trust and order the delivery of the property and a final accounting. The respondent judge issued an order on February 19, 1927, terminating the trust and ordering the delivery of property and an accounting within ten days. The petitioner appealed this order. Subsequently, on March 14, 1927, the respondent judge issued another order, requiring the petitioner to deliver the property and render a final account within fifteen days, notwithstanding the pending appeal. The Petition: This original proceeding was initiated by Ines Feliciano, seeking a writ of certiorari. She contends that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction by issuing the March 14, 1927 order, especially since similar petitions had been previously denied by other judges. She also argues that a clause in the will regarding the use of income until March 1931 should prolong the trust. The petitioner further challenges the judge's authority to order the execution of the February 19, 1927 order pending appeal. The Supreme Court is asked to annul the order of March 14, 1927, and dismiss the case.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 14, 1927, notwithstanding the appeal taken by the petitioner. Whether the fourteenth clause of the will, concerning the use of income until March 1931, had the effect of prolonging the trust. Whether the respondent judge acted within his discretion in ordering the execution of the order terminating the trust before it became final.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a writ of certiorari, holding that the respondent judge acted within his jurisdiction and did not exceed it in issuing the order of March 14, 1927, and in ordering its execution.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of exceeding jurisdiction due to prior denials: The Court held that previous denials of similar petitions by other judges do not act as a bar to the renewal of the petition or to the court deciding contrary to those prior orders. The orders denying the petition were not final. On the issue of the fourteenth clause prolonging the trust: The Court ruled that the provision in the fourteenth clause regarding the use of income until March 1931 did not have the effect of prolonging the trust. This provision was interpreted as an admonition to the heirs to conserve the property, specifically the apartment house and land, and to use the income for its acquisition, rather than a condition that extended the trust's duration. The thirteenth clause, which stated the trust would last until the beneficiaries were capable of taking care of their property, was considered the governing provision for the trust's termination. On the issue of discretionary execution of the order: The Court affirmed that it is discretionary for a judge to order the execution of an order issued within his jurisdiction, even before it becomes final, especially when the law is silent on the matter. The judge had jurisdiction over matters relating to the termination of trusts created by will, as provided by law. The Court cited authorities stating that when statutes do not provide an absolute right to a stay, the matter is left to the discretion of the court or judge. This discretion extends to ordering or suspending the execution of judgments in ordinary proceedings, as held in Go Changjo vs. Roldan Sy-Chanjo.
Main Doctrine
A writ of certiorari will not lie to annul an order of a respondent judge terminating a trust and ordering the delivery of property to beneficiaries, even if an appeal has been taken from said order, where the judge acted within his jurisdiction and the execution of the order is discretionary.