Purisima v. Morales
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In 2011, the Philippine National Police (PNP) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with WER FAST Documentary Agency, Inc. (WER FAST) for courier services to deliver firearm licenses, with WER FAST donating equipment for an online application system. This MOA was entered into without public bidding. Subsequently, the PNP's Legal Service reviewed the MOA and recommended that the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) formulate rules for accreditation of courier service providers. An Accreditation Policy was then established, outlining qualifications for accreditation, including being duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), having paid all income taxes, and securing clearances from the Directorate for Intelligence. In February 2013, then PNP Chief Director General Alan Purisima approved a recommendation to make the delivery of firearms license cards via courier mandatory, and WER FAST was accredited for this purpose. Procedural History: In 2014, two complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. The first complaint alleged violations of various laws, including that the MOA was procured without bidding, executed before WER FAST obtained its SEC certificate, WER FAST lacked DOTC authorization, Purisima had close ties with WER FAST, and the courier service was made mandatory in favor of WER FAST. The second complaint, filed by the Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), sought the administrative charge of gross negligence and/or gross neglect of duty against Purisima for approving the recommendation without verifying WER FAST's records and capability. On December 3, 2014, the Ombudsman issued an order preventively suspending Purisima and other PNP officials for six months without pay. Purisima and another official filed petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), which were consolidated. The CA affirmed the Ombudsman's order, holding that the petitions were moot due to the lapse of the suspension period but proceeded to rule on the merits, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman. The Petition: Petitioner former Police Director General Alan La Madrid Purisima filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing the CA's decision. The petition raised two issues: (a) whether the case was rendered moot and academic by the supervening lapse of the preventive suspension period, and (b) if not moot, whether the CA correctly held that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her discretion in issuing the preventive suspension order. Purisima argued that the preventive suspension order was issued without due process and constituted prejudgment of the case. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the case was not moot as it involved the validity of the preventive suspension order and Purisima's entitlement to back salaries. The Court found that the Ombudsman acted within her powers, as both conditions for preventive suspension under Section 24 of RA 6770 were met: the evidence of guilt was strong, and the charges warranted removal from office. The Court also clarified that the Ombudsman did not violate due process or prejudge the case by issuing the order before Purisima filed his counter-affidavit.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the lapse of the preventive suspension period. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her discretion in preventively suspending Purisima, including considerations of due process.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of mootness: The Court held that a case questioning the validity of a preventive suspension order is not rendered moot by the supervening lifting of the same. The Court, in the exercise of its expanded judicial power, may pass upon the validity of the order to determine if grave abuse of discretion attended its issuance. If found void, no legal rights can emanate from it, and the improperly suspended officer should be restored to his position with back salaries. Therefore, despite the lapse of the preventive suspension period, the petition retains practical value in resolving Purisima's entitlement to back salaries. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preventive suspension order and due process: The Court reiterated that the Ombudsman is authorized to preventively suspend under Section 24 of RA 6770 if two conditions are met: (a) the evidence of guilt is strong, and (b) any of the three circumstances are present (charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect of duty; charges warrant removal from service; or respondent's continued stay prejudices the case). The Court found that the second condition was met as the charge of gross neglect of duty, if proven, would warrant removal. Regarding the first condition, the Court deferred to the Ombudsman's judgment, noting that it was based on supporting documentary evidence. These included the Joint Affidavit of PNP officials, the absence of public bidding, WER FAST's lack of accreditation at the time of approval, its unproven track record, lack of DOTC accreditation, and failure to donate equipment as per the MOA. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman's determination that the evidence of guilt was strong. The Court clarified that the Ombudsman did not violate Purisima's right to due process or prejudge the case by issuing the preventive suspension order before he filed his counter-affidavit for the second complaint. Citing Lastimosa v. Ombudsman and Nera v. Garcia, the Court explained that preventive suspension is a preliminary, not punitive, measure, and prior notice and hearing are not required. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the Ombudsman's judgment, and a preliminary hearing is not necessary. The issuance of a preventive suspension order does not amount to a prejudgment of the merits of the case.
Main Doctrine
The Ombudsman is authorized to preventively suspend a public officer if the evidence of guilt is strong and the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect of duty, or would warrant removal from service, or the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case. The validity of a preventive suspension order is not rendered moot by its supervening lifting, as the Court may still pass upon its validity to determine if grave abuse of discretion attended its issuance.