Arroyo v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case involves allegations of plunder against former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benigno B. Aguas, stemming from the alleged amassing of ill-gotten wealth through a series of overt criminal acts. The core of the dispute centers on the alleged diversion and misuse of funds from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office's (PCSO) Confidential/Intelligence Fund (CIF) amounting to PHP 365,997,915.00. Procedural History: The petitioners, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benigno B. Aguas, were charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioners filed demurrers to evidence, which the Sandiganbayan denied. The petitioners then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petitions for certiorari, arguing grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan in denying their demurrers. On July 19, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the petitions, annulled the Sandiganbayan's resolutions, dismissed the plunder case against the petitioners for insufficiency of evidence, and ordered their immediate release. The State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, moved for a reconsideration of this decision. The Petition: The State's motion for reconsideration argued that the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari violated Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of Court, which prohibits review of an order denying a demurrer to evidence before judgment. It also contended that the Court's decision violated the State's right to due process by imposing additional elements for plunder (identification of a main plunderer and personal benefit) not present in the law, failing to consider all evidence, and erroneously concluding insufficiency. The petitioners opposed the motion, asserting that reconsideration would violate their right against double jeopardy due to their acquittal. The Supreme Court, in its resolution dated April 18, 2017, denied the motion for reconsideration, reiterating that certiorari was a proper remedy in cases of grave abuse of discretion and that the elements of plunder, including the need for personal benefit and the identification of a main plunderer, were correctly applied. The Court also affirmed that double jeopardy would bar a re-prosecution.
Issue(s)
Whether the Supreme Court erred in giving due course to a certiorari action assailing an interlocutory order denying a demurrer to evidence, in violation of Rule 119, Section 23 of the Rules of Court. Whether the Supreme Court committed grave errors amounting to a violation or deprivation of the State's fundamental right to due process by requiring additional elements for the prosecution of plunder (identification of the main plunderer and personal benefit) not provided in R.A. No. 7080. Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was fully taken into account, including irregularities in the CIF disbursement, commingling of funds, and diversion of funds; and whether the alleged nitpicking of the information was proper. Whether Arroyo and Aguas, by indispensable cooperation and conspiracy, committed plunder. Whether, even assuming plunder was not proven, the evidence showed guilt for malversation beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Ruling
The Supreme Court DENIED the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The Court reiterated that its power to issue the writ of certiorari to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure, even if the order assailed is interlocutory. The Court also affirmed that the acquittal of the petitioners due to the dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence was final and unappealable, and any attempt to reopen the case would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari despite the interlocutory nature of the order: The Court reiterated that its superintending control over lower courts allows it to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari when the denial of a demurrer to evidence is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure, as the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice. The prohibition in Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is not an insuperable obstacle to review by certiorari when grave abuse of discretion is evident. On the alleged violation of due process and additional elements for plunder: The Court found the State's submission unfounded. It clarified that the requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal benefit in the predicate act of raids on the public treasury are indeed written in R.A. No. 7080 and embedded in jurisprudence. The Court explained that the law requires a public officer to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth, necessitating the identification of the main plunderer among the accused. Furthermore, applying the maxim noscitur a sociis, the Court held that the phrase raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken, implying personal benefit, a requirement that was not removed by legislative amendments. On the alleged failure to consider all evidence and the alleged nitpicking of the information: The Court reiterated that it had fully considered all the evidence adduced, which was found insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of plunder – that any of the accused had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00. The dismissal was based on the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder. The Court clarified that its discussion of the essential need for the identification of the main plunderer was not about the sufficiency of the information but to enable itself to discern whether the evidence of guilt was sufficient. The Court found that the information contained nothing that averred the commission of an overt act by petitioner Arroyo to implicate her in the supposed conspiracy to commit plunder, and assiduously searched for but did not find sufficient incriminatory evidence against the petitioners. On the possibility of plunder: The Court found that the information contained nothing that averred the commission of an overt act by petitioner Arroyo to implicate her in the supposed conspiracy to commit plunder, and assiduously searched for but did not find sufficient incriminatory evidence against the petitioners. On the possibility of malversation: The Court found the State's position that it established a case for malversation to be entirely unfounded. It noted that the information in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 averred the crime of plunder and did not sufficiently allege the essential elements of malversation, highlighting the insufficiency of the allegations in this regard. On the prohibition against double jeopardy: The Court affirmed that the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence amounted to an acquittal. It reiterated that an acquittal is immediately final upon promulgation and cannot be recalled. Therefore, granting the State's motion for reconsideration would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy by effectively reopening the prosecution and subjecting the petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their acquittal.
Main Doctrine
The Court's power to issue the writ of certiorari to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure, even if the order assailed is interlocutory, as the duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion is a constitutional mandate. An acquittal based on demurrer to evidence, being a dismissal on the merits, is immediately final and unappealable, and any attempt to reopen the case would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.