Gago v. Mamuyac
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the probate of the last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac, who died on January 2, 1922. The petitioner, Francisco Gago, sought to have a will executed by Mamuyac on July 27, 1918, admitted to probate. 2. Procedural History: Francisco Gago initially petitioned the Court of First Instance of La Union for the probate of Miguel Mamuyac's 1918 will. This petition was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac and others. The court denied probate on November 2, 1923, on the grounds that the deceased had executed a new will on April 16, 1919. Subsequently, Gago initiated a new action on February 21, 1925, seeking to probate the 1919 will. This second petition was also opposed, and the court denied probate on the grounds that the 1919 will had been cancelled and revoked in 1920. The petitioner appealed this decision. 3. The Petition: The petitioner-appellant, Francisco Gago, appealed the denial of probate for the 1919 will. The appeal contends that the lower court erred in not finding that the will was executed with the required legal formalities, that it had been revoked and cancelled in 1920, that the presented document was a mere carbon copy, and that the oppositors were not estopped from raising these issues. The appellant is seeking the Supreme Court's review of these points.
Issue(s)
Whether the presumption of revocation arises when the original will was last seen in the possession of the testator but cannot be found after his death. Whether a carbon copy of a will (Exhibit A) may be admitted to probate when the original has been lost or destroyed.
Ruling
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. The probation of the will dated April 16, 1919, is disallowed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court ruled that where a will cannot be found after the death of the testator, but it is shown to have been in his possession when last seen, a presumption arises that the testator cancelled or destroyed it. This rule is grounded in the difficulty of proving revocation, as the law does not require evidence of cancellation to be preserved. The force of this presumption varies according to the circumstances; while it is not conclusive, it may only be overcome by competent proof that the will was not destroyed with the intent to revoke. In this case, the presumption was bolstered by positive testimony from witnesses who saw the testator actually cancel the document in 1920 because he had sold the property mentioned therein. Since the original was in the testator's possession and could not be found, the legal inference of revocation stands. On Issue 2: The Court held that copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. While a duplicate or carbon copy may be admitted if it is proven that the original was lost and not cancelled or destroyed by the testator, such admission is contingent upon the proponent establishing the non-revocation of the original. Here, because there was positive proof that the original 1919 will was cancelled by Miguel Mamuyac, the carbon copy (Exhibit A) cannot be admitted for probate. The proponent failed to satisfy the burden of proof regarding the continued existence of the will. Consequently, the trial court correctly disallowed the probate of the duplicate document.
Main Doctrine
A carbon copy of a will may be admitted to probate if it is proven that the original was executed with all legal formalities, was lost, and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator. The presumption of cancellation arises when a will, last seen in the testator's possession, cannot be found after his death, and this presumption can be overcome by proof that the testator did not intend to revoke it.