Somes v. Gorricho
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Ignacio Gorricho executed a promissory note on August 24, 1891, acknowledging receipt of 200 pesos from Manuel F. Somes and promising to return the sum in four monthly payments of 50 pesos each, starting November 1, 1891, until February 1892. No part of the sum was paid. Procedural History: The plaintiff, Enrique F. Somes (heir of Manuel F. Somes), initiated an action in the justice of the peace court of Manila to recover the 200 pesos. The defense argued that the action had prescribed under paragraph 3 of Article 1966 of the Civil Code. The justice of the peace ruled in favor of the defendants, dismissing the case. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, where the case was tried de novo. The Court of First Instance found that no part of the note had been paid and ruled that the action was not prescribed, ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff 200 pesos plus costs. The Appeal: The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging that the Court of First Instance erred in not finding the cause of action prescribed under Article 1964 of the Civil Code. The appellee (plaintiff) did not submit a brief.
Issue(s)
Whether the action to recover the sum of money based on the promissory note is prescribed under paragraph 3 of Article 1966 of the Civil Code. Whether the action is prescribed under Article 1964 of the Civil Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, ruling that the action was not prescribed and ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of two hundred pesos, with costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that paragraph 3 of Article 1966 of the Civil Code, which provides a five-year prescriptive period for "any other payments which should have been made annually or in shorter periods," does not apply to the promissory note in question. The Court reasoned that the obligations enumerated in Article 1966 (payments for support, rents) are of a specific class, and the phrase "any other payments" refers to obligations of a similar nature. The promissory note, with its fixed installment payments over a defined period, does not fall within this class. The Court emphasized that when the time of payment is fixed by agreement, the law should not give undue importance to the time transpiring before that date for the purpose of prescription under this specific article. On Issue 2: The Court determined that the action falls under the provisions of Article 1964 of the Civil Code, which states that "those obligations which are personal, and for which no special term of prescription is fixed, after fifteen years." Although the note had a payment schedule, the Court classified the underlying obligation as personal and without a "special term of prescription" in the context of Article 1966. The contract was dated August 24, 1891, and the action was commenced on May 24, 1903. Since fifteen years had not yet expired from the date of the contract, the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of First Instance was affirmed.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court held that an action to recover a sum of money based on a promissory note, where payments were to be made in installments over a fixed period, does not fall under the five-year prescriptive period provided for annual or shorter periodic payments in Article 1966 of the Civil Code. Instead, such an action is considered a personal action for which no special term is fixed, and thus, it prescribes after fifteen years as stipulated in Article 1964 of the Civil Code.