Re: Habitual Tardiness of Benedito
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: John B. Benedito (Benedito), Clerk III of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, Zambales, was found guilty of habitual tardiness and was suspended for ten (10) days without salary and other benefits. Procedural History: Benedito sought clarification on whether the ten-day suspension should be served in working days or calendar days. He served the suspension from October 6, 2017, to October 23, 2017, believing it should be served on working days. Upon inquiry, he was informed by the Leave Division that the suspension should have been served in calendar days, including Saturdays and Sundays. The Petition: Benedito argued that suspension is punitive and must be served on working days to be effective as a punishment. The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation.
Issue(s)
Whether the ten (10)-day suspension imposed on Benedito should be served in working days or calendar days. Whether Benedito should be considered on leave of absence for the days he did not report for work due to his erroneous interpretation of the suspension period.
Ruling
The Court declared that the suspension imposed upon Benedito contemplates ten (10) calendar days and not working days. It further ruled that Benedito should be deemed to have rendered full service to the court on October 18, 19, 20, and 23, 2017, and that this administrative matter is considered closed and terminated.
Ratio Decidendi
On the interpretation of suspension period: The Court held that the ten (10)-day suspension imposed on Benedito should be construed as ten (10) calendar days. It noted that in cases where the penalty is suspension, the reference is generally to calendar days. The Court cited the case of The Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System and Winston F. Garcia v. Albert M. Velasco and Mario I. Molina, where 'calendar days' were applied in counting a preventive suspension. The Court also drew an analogy from labor cases, where suspension orders that do not specify calendar or working days are interpreted in favor of the laborer, meaning calendar days. The Court emphasized that while Benedito argued that suspension served in calendar days loses its punitive nature, suspension carries accessory penalties such as a gap in the continuity of service and disqualification from promotion, and the employee is not entitled to monetary benefits during the period of suspension. The Court reiterated that the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service is silent on whether suspension should be for calendar or working days, thus supporting the interpretation in favor of calendar days. On Benedito's erroneous interpretation: The Court disagreed with the OCA's recommendation to deduct the days Benedito did not report for work from his leave credits. The Court found that Benedito merely erroneously interpreted the Resolution dated August 16, 2017, which was silent on the nature of the suspension days. The Court acknowledged that Benedito, as a Clerk III, was not shown to be learned in the law and could not have determined with certainty whether the suspension was by calendar or working days. The OCA itself noted the silence in the rules. Therefore, the mistake was induced through no fault of Benedito, similar to the situation in Wooden v. Civil Service Commission, where an honest mistake of fact excused the employee from legal consequences. The Court concluded that Benedito should be excused from the consequences of his erroneous interpretation and should not be considered on leave of absence for October 18, 19, 20, and 23, 2017, but rather deemed to have rendered full service on those days.
Main Doctrine
A suspension imposed as a penalty in administrative cases, when not specified as to whether it shall be served in calendar or working days, shall be construed as referring to calendar days. This interpretation is favorable to the employee and aligns with principles of labor law and the interpretation of legal periods in the absence of explicit statutory definition.