Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Gutierrez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against private respondents, who were members of the Board of Directors and Officers of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) and Philippine National Bank (PNB), for alleged violations of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). PCGG alleged that PNB extended undue and unwarranted accommodations to BISUDECO from 1977 to 1985, despite BISUDECO's continuous losses and capital deficiency. These accommodations were characterized as "behest loans" by a Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee due to undercollateralization and undercapitalization of BISUDECO. Procedural History: The Office of the Ombudsman, in a Resolution dated June 23, 2006, dismissed the complaint on the grounds of lack of probable cause and prescription. The Ombudsman found that loans granted from 1971 to 1981 were barred by prescription, applying the 10-year prescriptive period. For loans granted from 1982 to 1985, the 15-year prescriptive period under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195 was applicable, and the complaint was filed within this period. However, the Ombudsman also noted the lack of individual or collective participation of the respondents in the acts complained of for the later loans. PCGG's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman in an Order dated January 7, 2009. The Petition: PCGG filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, seeking to nullify the Ombudsman's Resolution and Order, arguing that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing PCGG's Complaint on the ground of prescription. Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing PCGG's Complaint on the ground of lack of probable cause.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed the Resolution dated June 23, 2006, and the Order dated January 7, 2009, of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman in dismissing the complaint.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Issue of Prescription: The Court reiterated that offenses under R.A. No. 3019 prescribe in ten (10) years, which was later increased to fifteen (15) years by Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, effective March 16, 1982. Applying the principle that the period more favorable to the accused should be adopted, the ten-year period was deemed applicable to acts committed prior to BP Blg. 195's effectivity. The prescriptive period begins to run from the date of discovery of the violation, not from the date of commission, under R.A. No. 3326. In this case, the discovery was on April 4, 1994 (Terminal Report), and the complaint was filed on January 28, 2005. Thus, the crimes related to loans from 1971 to 1981 had prescribed. For loans from 1982 to 1985, the 15-year period applied, and the complaint was filed within this period. However, the dismissal was ultimately upheld on the ground of lack of probable cause. On the Issue of Lack of Probable Cause: The Court emphasized that courts generally do not interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion to determine probable cause. The Ombudsman found that the complaint and supporting papers failed to establish probable cause. PCGG's sole basis for imputing liability on the private respondents was their membership in the PNB Board of Directors. The Court held that mere membership in the board is insufficient to establish probable cause; there must be a showing of personal participation in any irregularity. The complaint failed to allege specific acts constituting violations of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, and it did not provide proof of individual participation. The Court cited Kara-an v. Office of the Ombudsman to support the principle that approval of a loan during incumbency as director does not automatically establish probable cause absent a showing of personal participation in irregularity. Furthermore, the affiant of the complaint appeared to have no personal knowledge of the allegations, as indicated by the statement that the allegations could be attested to by others who did not execute affidavits. The Court also clarified that private persons can be held liable for conspiracy with public officers under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, but in this case, no violation was proven due to the lack of probable cause against the public officers involved.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, finding that the offenses had prescribed and that there was no probable cause due to the lack of allegations and evidence showing the individual participation of the private respondents in the alleged unlawful acts.