Espaldon v. Buban
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Atty. Renato M. Garbo III of the NBI, detailed at the DOF, received information regarding alleged tax evasion schemes employed by Ferrotech Steel Corporation and/or its President, Benito Keh, involving failure to issue and falsification of sales invoices, in violation of Sections 264 and 254 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Pursuant to a Letter of Authority from the DOF Secretary, search warrants were applied for and subsequently issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 47, for the premises of Ferrotech Steel Corporation and/or Keh. The NBI, PNR personnel, and private individuals served these search warrants. Petitioner Jonnel D. Espaldon, Corporate Secretary of Metal Exponents, Inc., and counsel for Ferrotech Steel Corporation and Metalex International Inc., alleged irregularities during the implementation of the search warrants, including the presence of heavily armed NBI agents, unauthorized non-NBI agents, private individuals orchestrating the search, seizure of documents belonging to other companies not named in the warrants, and illegal detention and threats against employees. Procedural History: Espaldon filed a complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against various respondents for violations of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, NIRC, Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. A supplemental complaint-affidavit for preventive suspension was also filed. The administrative aspect was docketed as OMB-C-A-11-0036-A for "Misconduct," and the criminal aspect as OMB-C-C-11-0034-A for "Violation of Articles 129 and 286 of the RPC and Section 3(e) Of R.A. No. 3019." The Ombudsman dismissed both complaints in separate Orders dated January 16, 2012, citing Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770, stating that the complaint essentially involved the interpretation of the Tariff and Customs Code, and that remedies could be sought from the Commissioner of Customs, the Department of Finance, or the Court of Tax Appeals. Espaldon's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman through a Joint Order dated March 12, 2012. The Petition: Espaldon filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the Ombudsman's Orders and to compel the Ombudsman to take cognizance of his criminal complaint. The core issue raised is whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in refusing to investigate the criminal act complained of based on Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint based on Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770. Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in deviating from its own rules of procedure for criminal cases.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The Order dated January 16, 2012 and Joint Order dated March 12, 2012 of the Office of the Ombudsman, insofar as they dismissed outright the criminal complaint docketed as OMB-C-C-11-0034-A, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Office of the Ombudsman is DIRECTED to take cognizance of the criminal complaint and evaluate the same in accordance with Section 2, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Ombudsman's dismissal of the criminal complaint based on Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770: The Court held that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint by invoking Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770, which provides exceptions for the investigation of "administrative acts or omissions." The Court emphasized that Section 20 of R.A. No. 6770, as clarified by Administrative Order No. 17 and jurisprudence, is applicable only to administrative complaints, not criminal ones. The dismissal of administrative complaints based on Section 20 is discretionary, not mandatory. The Ombudsman's reliance on this provision for the outright dismissal of a criminal complaint was therefore misplaced and constituted a grave abuse of discretion. On the Ombudsman's deviation from its rules of procedure for criminal cases: The Court found that the Ombudsman's procedure in dismissing the criminal complaint was contrary to its own Rules of Procedure. For criminal cases, Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 requires the investigating officer to evaluate the complaint and recommend whether it should be dismissed outright for want of palpable merit, referred for comment, indorsed to another agency, subjected to fact-finding, referred for administrative adjudication, or subjected to a preliminary investigation. The assailed Orders did not demonstrate any finding of palpable lack of merit; instead, they merely cited Section 20, which is inapplicable to criminal complaints. The Ombudsman's failure to follow its own procedural rules in evaluating the criminal complaint constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court clarified that while the Ombudsman has broad investigatory powers, its actions are subject to judicial scrutiny for grave abuse of discretion, which involves a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Main Doctrine
The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal complaint based on grounds applicable only to administrative cases, specifically Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770, and in deviating from its own rules of procedure for criminal cases.