People v. Ting
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents City Mayor Randolph S. Ting and City Treasurer Salvacion I. Garcia of Tuguegarao City were charged with violation of Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code for issuing a treasury warrant on April 30, 2004, during the 45-day election ban period, as payment for two parcels of land to be used as a public cemetery. The treasury warrant was for P8,486,027.00, payable to Anselmo Almazan, Angelo Almazan, and Anselmo Almazan III. The contract of sale was stipulated, and the issuance of the treasury warrant was admitted. The City Government registered the sale and obtained new titles on May 5, 2004. Procedural History: The case was initially dismissed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) finding no violation. However, the Supreme Court, in Guzman v. Commission on Elections, set aside the COMELEC's resolution and ordered the filing of the criminal information, finding probable cause for violation of Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus Election Code. After the prosecution rested its case, respondents filed a demurrer to evidence. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the demurrer and acquitted respondents, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the delivery of the treasury warrant within the prohibited period, noting that the drawee bank annotated May 18, 2004, as the date of payment. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's order, citing the Negotiable Instruments Law and the principle that an instrument is not issued until delivered, and that a check is not payment until encashed. The Petition: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, arguing that the CA erred in affirming the RTC's grant of the demurrer to evidence, as the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to establish a violation of Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court's order granting the demurrer to evidence despite the alleged sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, and the procedural propriety of the petition. Whether the respondents committed a violation of Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code. Whether the principle of double jeopardy bars the appeal of the acquittal order.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the petition is barred by the principle of double jeopardy, as the RTC's order granting the demurrer to evidence was a judgment of acquittal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Court of Appeals affirming the RTC's order and the procedural propriety of the petition: The Court clarified that while the grant of a demurrer to evidence is reviewable by the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the CA's decision on such a petition may be reviewed by the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. However, the Court found that the OSG's petition was fundamentally an appeal on the merits of the acquittal, which is barred by double jeopardy. The Court reiterated that certiorari under Rule 65 is for correcting grave abuse of discretion, not mere errors of judgment. Since no grave abuse of discretion was demonstrated, the acquittal could not be reversed. On the alleged violation of Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code: The Court noted that the OSG's argument regarding the sufficiency of evidence was rendered moot by the application of the double jeopardy principle. However, it discussed the substantive issue to clarify the law. The Court explained that Section 261 (w)(b) is violated when a person issues, uses, or avails of treasury warrants or similar devices undertaking future delivery of money, goods, or things of value chargeable against public funds during the prohibited election period. The Court found merit in the OSG's argument that the date of the treasury warrant (April 30, 2004) and the notarization of the deed of sale (May 5, 2004) indicated that the warrant was issued or at least acknowledged within the prohibited period. The Court also clarified that actual payment or encashment of the warrant after the prohibited period does not negate the offense, as the offense is committed upon the issuance, use, or availment of the warrant within the ban. The Court further stated that the term "issues" in the Omnibus Election Code should be construed in its general sense, not limited to the strict definition under the Negotiable Instruments Law, to give effect to the law's intent. On the issue of double jeopardy: The Court reiterated that a demurrer to evidence filed after the prosecution has rested its case, if granted, is tantamount to an acquittal and bars an appeal by the prosecution due to the prohibition against double jeopardy. The elements of double jeopardy were present: a valid information, a competent court, a plea of not guilty, and an acquittal. The Court emphasized that while an acquittal by demurrer to evidence may be reviewed via certiorari under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion, the OSG's petition under Rule 45 was improper. Furthermore, there was no showing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The RTC's alleged misappreciation of evidence, even if assumed, would be a mere error of judgment, not correctible by certiorari.
Main Doctrine
The grant of a demurrer to evidence, which results in acquittal, is generally not appealable due to the prohibition against double jeopardy. However, such acquittal may be reviewed via certiorari under Rule 65 if the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere errors in the interpretation or appreciation of evidence do not constitute grave abuse of discretion.