Villanueva v. Reodique
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On January 17, 2011, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Loida S. Villanueva (Villanueva) alleged that while walking in Cembo, Makati City, she observed F/SInsp. Rolando T. Reodique (respondent) drinking with friends. Respondent purportedly shouted defamatory words at Villanueva, including "Hoy Loida, pakantutin kal 'Yang asawa mo, Vic Morro[w], Bantay-Bantayan! Putang ina n'yo! Fuck you!" while also making a dirty finger gesture. Villanueva reported the incident to the barangay that same night. She claimed respondent's maligning behavior began in November 2010 after her husband quit Guardians Brotherhood, Inc., a group led by respondent. A witness, Lorna T. Sagaydoro, corroborated Villanueva's account. Respondent denied the allegations, asserting that Villanueva initiated the verbal attack, shouting invectives at him from outside his house. Respondent's witnesses, Jorge Abad, Elmer Umali, Jefferson Malto, and Arnulfo Cruz, corroborated his version, stating they were discussing a movie when Villanueva passed by and started shouting at respondent. Procedural History: Villanueva formalized her complaint before the barangay on January 19, 2011, and obtained a Certificate to File Action on March 1, 2011, after no settlement was reached. On March 17, 2011, Villanueva submitted a Salaysay ng Pagrereklamo, including as supplemental evidence a previous Ombudsman Decision dated June 15, 2009, in Judith O. Mon v. F/Insp. Rolando T. Reodique, where respondent was suspended for six months without pay for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for uttering defamatory words. The Office of the City Prosecutor had also dismissed respondent's oral defamation and grave threats case against Villanueva. In its Decision dated August 23, 2012, the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) found respondent administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service (second offense) and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold public office. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated April 29, 2015, affirmed respondent's administrative liability but modified the penalty to suspension for one (1) year without pay, citing his more than twenty-six (26) years of service and several awards and commendations, deeming dismissal disproportionate. The Petition: Both Loida S. Villanueva and the Office of the Ombudsman filed consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution. They did not question the determination of respondent's administrative liability but sought the modification of the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, arguing that the penalty of dismissal from service, as originally imposed by the Ombudsman, should be reinstated.
Issue(s)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it modified the penalty of dismissal from the service into suspension for one (1) year without pay; and whether the respondent was correctly found administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Ruling
The petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated April 29, 2015, and the Resolution dated November 24, 2015, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 136506 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 23, 2012, and the Joint Order dated December 5, 2013, of the Office of the Ombudsman are REINSTATED. Respondent F/SInsp. Rolando T. Reodique is DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE, with forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold public office; provided, that if the penalty of dismissal from the service can no longer be served by reason of retirement or resignation, the alternative penalty of FINE equivalent to respondent's salary for ONE (1) YEAR shall be imposed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court agreed with the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals in holding respondent administratively liable for the offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Court found that respondent's acts of hurling invectives at Villanueva and giving her the dirty finger sign tarnished the image and integrity of his public office, which constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as defined by jurisprudence. The Court reiterated that findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law, none of which were found in this case. The Court found no reason to disturb the concurrent findings of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals regarding respondent's administrative liability. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it modified the penalty of dismissal from the service into suspension for one (1) year without pay. Section 22(t), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) clearly states that for a second offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, the penalty is dismissal. The Court emphasized that the law did not make an exception to this prescribed penalty on the basis of "disproportionateness" or "harshness," nor did it qualify the penalties by considering the public officer's years in service or received awards and commendations. Citing Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court affirmed that as long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. Since respondent had a prior administrative liability for the same offense in Judith O. Mon v. F/Insp. Rolando T. Reodique, the present case constitutes his second offense, mandating the penalty of dismissal from service.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed that 'conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service' is a grave administrative offense that tarnishes the image and integrity of public office, regardless of whether the act is related to official functions. For repeat offenders, the prescribed penalty of dismissal from service, as stipulated in civil service laws and rules, must be strictly imposed. Courts are bound to apply statutory mandates without introducing exceptions based on factors like length of service or commendations, as these are not provided for by law.