People v. Sullano
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On October 16, 2012, fifty (50) police officers, including respondent PO1 Johnny K. Sullano, were ordered to undergo random drug testing pursuant to Section 36, Article III of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165). Respondent's urine sample tested positive for methamphetamine. A confirmatory test yielded the same result. Consequently, a Complaint Affidavit was filed against respondent for violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Respondent manifested that he voluntarily submitted to the test, did not use the drug, had no means to contest the veracity of the test, and had entered a rehabilitation program. An information was filed charging respondent with unlawfully and feloniously using methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and testing positive for its use after a confirmatory test. Procedural History: Respondent pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence, arguing that the State failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt as he was never apprehended or arrested for using a dangerous drug. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the demurrer, dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence, opining that Section 15 presupposes apprehension or arrest and that respondent should have been administratively charged instead. The RTC’s order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) upon finding no grave abuse of discretion. The CA reiterated that the first element of Section 15, i.e., apprehension or arrest, was absent. The Petition: The People of the Philippines filed a petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the demurrer. Petitioner contended that Section 15 should not be interpreted to exclusively apply to apprehended or arrested individuals, and that a positive result from a mandatory drug test under Section 36 is sufficient for prosecution under Section 15. Petitioner also argued that the RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion and that respondent should have been held criminally liable, not just administratively.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it held that the Regional Trial Court did not gravely abuse its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in granting respondent's demurrer to evidence. Whether Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the apprehension or arrest of a person for the latter to be considered as violating the provision; including considerations of double jeopardy, interpretation of penal statutes, and the application of jurisprudence.
Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, upholding the dismissal of the case against the respondent.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Court of Appeals' decision regarding grave abuse of discretion: The Court found that the elements of double jeopardy were present in the respondent's case. It noted that the dismissal of the case and the grant of the demurrer were not attended with grave abuse of discretion, thus the acquittal was final and unappealable, precluding the attachment of double jeopardy. On the issue of whether Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 requires apprehension or arrest: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The Court emphasized the plain-meaning rule (verba legis) and the principle of expressio unius est exclusion alterius. Section 15 explicitly states, "A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug...". This phrase qualifies the subject person, meaning only those who are apprehended or arrested and found positive for drug use can be prosecuted under this provision. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that Section 15 should be read in conjunction with Section 36, Article III, which mandates random drug testing for police officers. The information filed against the respondent specifically alleged a violation of Section 15 and did not mention Section 36, thus, to include Section 36 would deprive the respondent of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Court reiterated the principle of strict construction of penal laws (nullum crimen poena sine lege), stating that courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law that are not clearly embraced by it. The Court disagreed with the petitioner's assertion that a narrow interpretation of Section 15 would lead to an absurd situation where individuals testing positive under Section 36 could not be penalized. The Court found a harmonious reading by construing the last paragraph of Section 36, which states that those found positive shall be subject to Section 15, to mean that the penalty of rehabilitation under Section 15 may be imposed. This interpretation aligns with the law's intent to encourage rehabilitation rather than incarceration. The Court also stressed that in dubiis reus est absolvendus, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. The Court distinguished the present case from Dela Cruz v. People, noting that while Dela Cruz also interpreted "apprehended or arrested," the information in the present case was specific to Section 15 and did not relate it to Section 36. The Court clarified that Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. No. 9165, not for any crime. To extend its application to all persons arrested for any crime would unduly expand its meaning and potentially violate constitutional rights, such as the right to privacy and the prohibition against self-incrimination, as highlighted in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.
Main Doctrine
Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, which penalizes the use of dangerous drugs, requires that the person be apprehended or arrested before they can be prosecuted under this provision. A positive result from a random drug test conducted pursuant to Section 36, Article III of the same Act, without prior apprehension or arrest for a crime, does not, by itself, constitute a violation of Section 15.