Re: News Report of Canlas

A.M. No. 16-03-10-SC · 2019-10-15 · J. CARPIO, J.: · Primary: Ethics; Secondary: Remedial, Political
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: On March 8, 2016, Jomar Canlas, a senior reporter for The Manila Times, published an article alleging that Supreme Court (SC) Justices were offered P50 million each to disqualify Senator Grace Poe from the 2016 presidential elections. The article, citing 'well-placed sources,' claimed that two bribery attempts were made by individuals 'very close' to President Benigno Aquino III and Manuel 'Mar' Roxas II, including a female lawyer and a member of the Liberal Party (LP). The report included a disclaimer that the Justices refused the offer and quoted an unnamed magistrate stating the tribunal would not bow to pressure. Procedural History: On March 15, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution citing that statements and innuendoes in the news report tended to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Canlas was directed to explain why no sanction for indirect contempt should be imposed. On April 22, 2016, Canlas submitted his explanation, asserting that the report was a matter of public interest, that he acted with good motives, and that the article actually portrayed the Court as incorruptible because it mentioned the Justices rebuffed the bribe. The Petition: This is an administrative matter for indirect contempt initiated by the Supreme Court motu proprio. Canlas argued that his report was a legitimate exercise of freedom of the press and that he attempted to interview the Justices but was unsuccessful. He maintained that his intention was to inform the public of the failed bribery attempts and that his actions were done in good faith for justifiable ends, emphasizing that the article painted an image of an incorruptible Court.

Issue(s)

Whether Jomar Canlas is guilty of indirect contempt of court under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court for publishing the unverified news report regarding the alleged bribery of Supreme Court Justices.

Ruling

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Jomar Canlas GUILTY of Indirect Contempt of Court in accordance with Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, and hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDS him with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1: The Court held that while freedom of the press is a protected constitutional right, it is not absolute and must be adjusted to the requirements of the administration of justice. Applying the 'clear and present danger' test, the Court found that the substantive evil—the degradation of judicial integrity—was serious and the degree of imminence was extremely high. The Court noted that Canlas failed to establish the legitimacy of his report or demonstrate sufficient attempts to verify the grave accusations before publication. The article's sensationalist nature and the imputation of bribery against specific political figures and unnamed justices created a false impression that overshadowed the brief mention of the bribe being refused. Citing In Re Emil P. Jurado, the Court emphasized that there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact, especially those that undermine the public's trust in the judiciary. Consequently, the Court determined that the report tended to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, warranting a finding of indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 3(d).

Main Doctrine

The Court balances the constitutional guarantee of free speech and press against judicial independence using the 'clear and present danger' and 'dangerous tendency' rules. While the press acts as a watchdog, it cannot disseminate unverified, false, or sensationalized reports that impute corruption to the judiciary, as such acts impede and degrade the administration of justice. Good faith is not a defense when the reporter fails to verify the truthfulness of grave accusations before publication. This case reaffirms that the protection of the courts against contempt is a necessary limitation on the freedom of expression to ensure the orderly functioning of the justice system.

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