Jebsens Maritime v. Pasamba
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Ruperto S. Pasamba was hired as an Able Seaman by petitioners Jebsens Maritime, Inc. and Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft. On January 24, 2010, respondent experienced symptoms of illness, leading to his repatriation on February 5, 2010. He was diagnosed with sinusitis, myringitis, vascular headache, and unstable angina (suspicion), and later with polysinusitis, hypoplastic frontal sinuses, congested turbinates, and bilateral mastoiditis. He underwent mastoidectomy and tympanoplasty procedures. On July 9, 2010, the company-designated doctors declared him "fit to work." More than a year later, in November 2011, respondent secured re-employment. On July 31, 2012, an independent doctor diagnosed him with moderate sensorineural hearing loss and profound mixed hearing loss, prompting him to claim permanent and total disability benefits. Procedural History: The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent was not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits, citing the company-designated doctors' fitness to work declaration and his subsequent re-employment, but awarded attorney's fees and sickness allowance from sign-off until declared fit to work. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed this, granting permanent and total disability benefits based on the inability to work for more than 120 days and the fitness declaration occurring on the 154th day. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the NLRC's ruling, holding that inability to work for more than 120 days establishes permanent total disability, even if the fitness declaration is made after 120 days. The Petition: Petitioners assail the CA's decision, arguing that inability to work for more than 120 days does not automatically equate to permanent and total disability, nor does a late fitness declaration. They also question the award of sickness allowance and attorney's fees.
Issue(s)
Whether respondent is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. Whether respondent is entitled to sickness allowance from repatriation until final assessment of the company-designated doctors. Whether respondent is entitled to attorney's fees.
Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious. The Supreme Court deleted the award of permanent and total disability benefits but affirmed the awards for sickness allowance and attorney's fees.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1 (Permanent and Total Disability Benefits): The Court ruled that respondent is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. It clarified that the mere inability to work for more than 120 days does not automatically grant such benefits, nor does a fitness-to-work declaration issued beyond the 120-day period automatically establish permanent total disability. The Court emphasized the guidelines laid down in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr., which allow for an extension of the diagnosis and treatment period up to 240 days if there is sufficient justification, such as the need for further medical treatment. In this case, the respondent underwent two surgeries and required a recovery period of almost three months for the second surgery, with further observation and medication needed thereafter. This justified the extension beyond 120 days. The company-designated doctors' assessment of fitness to work on the 154th day fell within the 240-day extension period. Furthermore, the respondent's failure to question the company doctors' findings until two years later, and his subsequent re-employment, bolstered the conclusion that he was not permanently and totally disabled. His failure to comply with the procedure of referring to a third doctor in case of disagreement with the company-designated physician's assessment also justified disregarding the independent doctor's assessment. On Issue 2 (Sickness Allowance): The Court affirmed the award of sickness allowance for the entire period of temporary disability, from repatriation until the declaration of fitness to work. This period, from February 5, 2010, to July 9, 2010 (154 days), falls within the extended period allowed for temporary total disability benefits, even though it exceeded the initial 120 days. The Court harmonized the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, which allow for a 240-day extension, with Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC. The Court found that the respondent was entitled to income benefits during his treatment, which necessarily extended beyond 120 days but within the 240-day extension. The provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement limiting sickness pay to 130 days was deemed contrary to law and jurisprudence. On Issue 3 (Attorney's Fees): The Court found no ground to disturb the uniform award of attorney's fees. It cited Article 2208(8) of the Civil Code, which allows for the award of attorney's fees in cases involving indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws. The award was justified as the respondent was compelled to litigate to recover his rightful benefits.
Main Doctrine
The mere inability to work for more than 120 days does not automatically entitle a seafarer to permanent and total disability benefits. The company-designated physician's assessment of fitness to work, even if issued beyond 120 days but within the 240-day extension period with justification, shall be respected, especially if the seafarer fails to comply with the procedure for referral to a third doctor.