Tagastason v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents In March 2012, Susano and Emalyn Bacala, along with their witnesses, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Murder and Frustrated Murder against Jessie Tagastason, Rogelio Tagastason, Jr., Marlon Tagastason, Jerson Tagastason, Elias Tagastason, Annie Bacala-Tagastason, Gil Ugacho, and Merlyn Bacala-Ugacho. The accused sought an extension to file their counter-affidavits, but the City Prosecutor granted a shorter period. Subsequently, the City Prosecutor found probable cause for the charges and filed Informations, leading to the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Executive Judge. Procedural History The accused learned of the charges and arrest warrants on April 10, 2012, and immediately filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice (DOJ), an Administrative Complaint against the City Prosecutor, and a Motion for Inhibition and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest with the trial court. The trial court denied the motion to hold in abeyance but set the motion for inhibition for hearing. While a motion for reconsideration of the denial was pending, the accused filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, citing urgency due to the potential deprivation of liberty. The Petition The petitioners, Jessie Tagastason, Rogelio Tagastason, Jr., Annie Bacala-Tagastason, and Jerson Tagastason, filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the Supreme Court. They assailed the Court of Appeals' decision, which denied their petition and upheld the trial court's order denying their motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest. The core arguments raised concern the alleged reversible error in sustaining the warrants of arrest and the ruling that they were not deprived of due process, particularly regarding the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the arrest warrants.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in sustaining the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Maclang. Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling that petitioners were not deprived of due process.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issuance of warrants of arrest: The Court reiterated that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is within the discretion of the issuing judge upon determination of the existence of probable cause. It distinguished between the executive determination of probable cause by the prosecutor, which pertains to whether there is enough evidence to support an Information, and the judicial determination by the judge, which ascertains whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge makes an independent assessment for the purpose of issuing the warrant and does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor. The Court stressed that the judge's function to issue a warrant of arrest upon determination of probable cause is exclusive and cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice, as this would be an encroachment on the judge's prerogative. Furthermore, an appeal to the DOJ Secretary does not automatically hold in abeyance proceedings before the trial court, and no motion to defer proceedings was filed in this case. On the denial of due process: The Court agreed with the CA that the petitioners should not assume that their motion for extension to file counter-affidavits would be granted. The Court noted that the 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors provides that extensions for submitting a counter-affidavit should not exceed ten days, and the petitioners had requested a 15-day extension, which was reasonably shortened by the City Prosecutor to ten days. The Court also found that the petition for review before the DOJ Secretary was still pending, making it premature for the Supreme Court to preempt the DOJ Secretary's resolution on the issue of due process concerning the preliminary investigation. Regarding the motion for inhibition, the Court held that its resolution was within Judge Maclang's discretion, and the petitioners filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA without waiting for the judge to resolve the motion. The Court also found that the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to support their allegations of prejudice against Judge Maclang.
Main Doctrine
The judicial determination of probable cause by a judge for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is independent of the executive determination made by the prosecutor, and the judge's prerogative to issue such a warrant cannot be deferred pending the resolution of an appeal to the Department of Justice regarding the prosecutor's finding.