People v. Calabon
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Domingo Calabon was convicted of homicide and sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal. He appealed and posted a bail bond of P12,000 with Valeriana Raymundo and Teodora Falconan as sureties. This Court affirmed the trial court's decision. Procedural History: Upon remand, Calabon failed to appear, leading to the forfeiture of his bail bond and an order for his arrest. The sureties sought and were granted extensions to apprehend Calabon. Despite these extensions, they failed to produce the accused. Consequently, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the sureties for the full amount of the bond. The sureties appealed this judgment to the Supreme Court, but their appeals were dismissed for failure to file briefs within the prescribed period. The Petition: Subsequently, one surety, Victoriana Raymundo, filed a motion to be relieved of liability, citing extensive efforts to apprehend Calabon, including offering a reward and incurring expenses. She reported that Calabon had been apprehended and was serving his sentence. The other surety, Teodora Falconan, filed a similar motion. The provincial fiscal opposed these motions, but the lower court granted them, cancelling the bond. The Attorney-General appealed this order.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance exceeded its jurisdiction in discharging the sureties from all liability on a bail bond that had been declared forfeited more than thirty days prior to the issuance of the order of discharge.
Ruling
The order appealed from is modified. Upon payment by the sureties of P3,000, jointly and severally, within sixty days from the return of the record to the lower court, they shall be relieved from further liability on the bond. No costs are allowed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Attorney-General's contention, asserting that Section 76 of General Order No. 58 limits the courts' authority to discharge a forfeiture to within a thirty-day period, possessed merit. The Court explicitly stated that it seems obvious a complete discharge cannot be granted after the expiration of that thirty-day period. However, the Court clarified that this statutory limitation does not entirely divest the court of its inherent discretionary powers concerning the amount of the sureties' liability. Citing its prior ruling in People vs. Reyes, 48 Phil., 139, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that where the primary purpose of the recognizance, which is to ensure the principal's appearance to serve sentence, has been fulfilled by placing the principal in prison, the bondsmen may be partially relieved from their liability. Taking into consideration the diligent efforts exerted by one of the sureties to apprehend Domingo Calabon and the crucial fact that Calabon was indeed arrested and commenced serving his sentence before the sureties' appeal in G.R. No. 28635 was even dismissed, the Supreme Court deemed it appropriate and equitable to reduce the sureties' liability to P3,000, instead of completely discharging it.
Main Doctrine
While Section 76 of General Orders No. 58 limits the discharge of a forfeited bail bond to thirty days, courts retain inherent discretionary powers to reduce the sureties' liability when the purpose of the recognizance has been accomplished by the principal's apprehension and commencement of sentence, based on the merits of the case.