Municipality of Tupi v. Faustino
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The Municipality of Tupi, concerned about a high rate of road accidents, enacted Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014, establishing speed limits on a specific stretch of national highway. The ordinance set a speed limit of 80 kph from Crossing Polonuling to Crossing Acmonan and 40 kph from Crossing Acmonan to Crossing Cebuano, with prescribed penalties for violations. Respondent Atty. Herminio B. Faustino was apprehended for exceeding the 40 kph limit and paid a fine under protest. He subsequently filed a petition challenging the ordinance's validity. 2. Procedural History: Respondent filed a petition for declaratory relief, annulment of the ordinance, and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Municipality argued that declaratory relief was improper as the ordinance had already been breached. The Office of the Solicitor General noted that the ordinance imposed stiffer penalties than Republic Act No. 4136 and that certain enforcement aspects were beyond the local government's authority. The RTC declared the ordinance void ab initio for failing to comply with RA No. 4136 regarding highway classification and signage, and for imposing uniform speed limits contrary to the law's vehicle classifications. The RTC also ordered the refund of all collected fines. Both parties moved for reconsideration, which the RTC denied, but granted execution to halt the ordinance's implementation. 3. The Petition: The Municipality of Tupi appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the ordinance was valid and complied with RA No. 4136, that the speed limits were appropriate for the described road conditions, and that the Land Transportation Office's deputation of enforcers implied compliance with highway classification requirements. They also contended the refund order was baseless and that the ordinance had demonstrably reduced accidents. The Supreme Court, however, treated the petition as one for certiorari and prohibition, finding that the ordinance failed to comply with the publication requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991 and contravened RA No. 4136 by not adhering to its provisions on highway classification, signage, and uniform speed limits. The Court affirmed the refund of the fine paid by respondent Faustino but deleted the order for the refund of fines collected from other motorists.
Issue(s)
1. Is a petition for declaratory relief the proper remedy to assail the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014, which has already been enforced and violated? 2. Did Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014, comply with the publication requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991? 3. Does Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014, violate Republic Act No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code)? 4. Is the trial court's directive for the refund of all fines collected pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014, proper?
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari, affirming the RTC's Decision with modification. It declared Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014, void ab initio. The Court modified the order for refund, limiting it only to the fine paid by respondent Herminio B. Faustino and deleting the order for the refund of all other fines collected from other motorists.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1 (Proper Remedy): The Court ruled that a petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy to assail the validity of an ordinance that has already been enforced and violated. Citing Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, the Court explained that declaratory relief presupposes no breach or violation has occurred. Since respondent Faustino had already been apprehended and fined, the ordinance had been breached. The appropriate remedies in such a situation are certiorari and prohibition, which allow for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, including legislative actions of local government units. However, the Court treated the petition as one for certiorari and prohibition, given that all essential allegations were pleaded, to finally resolve the issues involved. On Issue 2 (Publication Requirement): The Court held that Municipal Ordinance No. 688 failed to comply with the publication requirement under Section 59 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The ordinance stipulated its effectivity upon posting for fifteen days in three conspicuous places, but Section 59(c) and Section 511(a) mandate publication in a newspaper of general circulation within the province, where available, for ordinances with penal sanctions. The Court noted that the Municipality did not present evidence of the unavailability of such a newspaper in South Cotabato and did not refute the lack of publication. Citing Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila, the Court emphasized that proper publication is essential to inform affected parties and is a safeguard against unreasonable exercise of power. Without proper publication, the ordinance did not become effective or enforceable. On Issue 3 (Violation of RA 4136): The Court found that Ordinance No. 688 contravened Sections 35, 36, and 38 of RA No. 4136. Section 36 explicitly prohibits provincial, city, or municipal authorities from enacting or enforcing ordinances specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in RA 4136. Section 38 requires LGUs to classify public highways for traffic purposes, mark them with appropriate signs, certify designations like "through streets" to the LTO, and obtain LTO approval for such classifications and signs. The Court found that the Municipality failed to comply with these prerequisites: it did not classify its highways according to RA 4136 categories, did not mark them with visible signs, did not certify "through streets" to the LTO, and did not obtain LTO approval. The ordinance also imposed uniform speed limits for all vehicle types, contrary to RA 4136's classification of vehicles (passenger cars/motorcycles vs. trucks/buses) with different speed limits. The Court reiterated the ruling in Primicias v. the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which declared a similar ordinance void for failing to comply with RA 4136's classification and signage requirements. On Issue 4 (Refund of Fines): The Court ruled that the order for the refund of the P1,000.00 fine paid by respondent Faustino was warranted as an incidental relief to the nullification of the ordinance. This is because the collection of the fine was based on an illegal exaction. However, the Court deleted the trial court's order for the refund of all other fines collected from other motorists. This was because respondent Faustino did not represent himself as acting on behalf of others, these other persons were not joined as parties to the case, and no evidence was presented regarding their personal circumstances. The Court also clarified that the doctrine of operative fact did not apply because the doctrine was not raised by the parties, there was no reliance in good faith by the public, and the fines could be refunded without inequity or injustice.
Main Doctrine
A petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy to assail the validity of an ordinance that has already been enforced and violated. The appropriate remedies are certiorari and prohibition. Furthermore, an ordinance that fails to comply with the publication requirement under the Local Government Code and contravenes provisions of Republic Act No. 4136, particularly regarding the classification of highways and uniform speed limits, is void ab initio.