Jorge v. Marcelo

G.R. No. 232989 · 2019-03-18 · J. PERALTA, J.: · Primary: Labor; Secondary: Civil, Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Private respondents filed cases for illegal dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave pay, 13th-month pay, separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees against R. Jorgensons Swine Multiplier Corporation and Romeo J. Jorge. Executive Labor Arbiter Santos rendered a Decision in favor of private respondents, ordering the respondents to pay separation pay, nominal damages, and attorney's fees. Procedural History: Writs of Execution were issued to collect the monetary award. Rufina S. Jorge filed a Third Party Claim over a real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-45328, alleging she is the sole registered owner and that the property was levied upon due to the phrase "married to Romeo J. Jorge" appearing on the title. She argued this phrase is merely descriptive of her civil status and not indicative of conjugal ownership. Labor Arbiter Santos dismissed the Third Party Claim, opining that the property is presumed conjugal as it was acquired during the marriage, citing Dewara v. Lamela. Rufina's Petition for Extraordinary Remedies before the NLRC was denied for lack of merit and procedural flaws, specifically the failure to post a bond. The NLRC's denial was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) due to procedural defects in Rufina's petition for certiorari, including defective jurat and lack of complete postal addresses. The CA later denied Rufina's motion for reconsideration, citing the defective jurat despite other defects being cured. The Petition: Rufina filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing the CA's Resolutions. She argued that the CA erred in dismissing her petition on procedural grounds and that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing her Third Party Claim outright. She maintained that the phrase "married to" is merely descriptive and that the property is her exclusive paraphernal property.

Issue(s)

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Rufina S. Jorge's petition for certiorari on procedural grounds, specifically the defective jurat. Whether the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Rufina S. Jorge's Third Party Claim outright. Whether the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-45328 is Rufina S. Jorge's exclusive paraphernal property or conjugal property.

Ruling

The petition is GRANTED. The March 2, 2017 and June 23, 2017 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the NLRC to determine with reasonable dispatch the ownership of the real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-45328.

Ratio Decidendi

On the procedural defect of the jurat: The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground of a defective jurat. The Court clarified that while a jurat requires competent evidence of identity, this requirement can be dispensed with if the signatory is personally known to the notary public. The phrase "married to Romeo J. Jorge" on the title was merely descriptive of Rufina's civil status, and her personal knowledge by the notary public, as stated in the jurat, was sufficient. The Court emphasized that the disjunctive "or" in the definition of a "jurat" allows for either personal knowledge or identification through competent evidence. The failure to state the details of the competent evidence of identity in the notarial certificate is inconsequential if the affiant is personally known to the notary public. Therefore, the CA should have resolved the petition on its merits. On the dismissal of the Third Party Claim: The Supreme Court found that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Rufina's Third Party Claim outright. While Rufina did not post the required bond to suspend execution proceedings, the NLRC should have still ruled on the merits of her other prayers, particularly the determination of ownership of the property. The Court noted that the 2015 amendments to the NLRC Rules of Procedure did not require a bond to file a Third Party Claim, although posting a bond was necessary to suspend execution. The failure to post a bond only meant that execution could proceed against other properties, not that the claim itself was automatically defective or subject to dismissal. The claim should have been resolved based on its substantive merits. On the ownership of the property: The Supreme Court held that the phrase "married to Romeo J. Jorge" appearing after Rufina's name on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-45328 is merely descriptive of her civil status and does not, by itself, establish that the property is conjugal. The Court reiterated that for the presumption of conjugal ownership to apply, it must first be proven that the property was acquired during the marriage. The party asserting this presumption bears the burden of proving this time element. In the absence of proof as to when the property was acquired, the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal property. The Court emphasized that registration under the Torrens system confirms existing title, it does not create it. Therefore, the case was remanded to the NLRC to allow private respondents to present evidence proving when the property was acquired.

Main Doctrine

The phrase "married to" appearing on a certificate of title is merely descriptive of the marital status of the registered owner and does not, by itself, establish that the property is conjugal. The presumption of conjugal ownership requires proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.

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