Saldana v. Consunji
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Pedro Saldana filed a motion of protest against the election of Crispulo Consunji as municipal president of Samal, Bataan, following elections held on June 5, 1928. Saldana alleged that over fifty ballots bearing his name were rejected, that sufficient ballots were rejected to change the result, and that election inspectors counted ballots bearing Saldana's name in favor of Consunji. He also alleged electioneering by Consunji's leaders. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissed the protest upon motion of Consunji, citing lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of an allegation of proclamation of an elected candidate. Saldana sought to amend his motion to include the proclamation date (June 6, 1928), but this was objected to by Consunji as an attempt to file a new protest beyond the legal period. The trial court denied the amendment and upheld the dismissal. The Petition: Saldana appealed the dismissal, assigning as errors the dismissal of the protest, the refusal to admit the amendment, and the imposition of costs.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the protest for lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of an allegation of proclamation of an elected candidate. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit the protestant's amendment to his motion of protest, which sought to include the allegation of proclamation, filed after the statutory period for filing the protest.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the protest, with costs against the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the protest for lack of jurisdiction. Section 479 of the Administrative Code, as amended, mandates that an election protest must be filed within two weeks after the proclamation of an elected candidate. This legal provision renders a prior proclamation indispensable, not only to identify the legally elected candidate against whom the protest is filed, but also to mark the commencement of the statutory period for filing the protest. For a Court of First Instance to acquire and exercise jurisdiction over an election contest, it must determine from the face of the motion of protest whether it contains all the essential jurisdictional requisites. Since the original motion of protest in this case did not allege the fact of a proclamation, the trial court could not ascertain if it had acquired jurisdiction or if the protest was timely filed. Essential facts that confer special jurisdiction are not presumed; they must clearly appear in the motion. Citing Ferrer vs. Gutierrez David and Lucot (43 Phil., 795) and Tengco vs. Jocson (43 Phil., 715), the Court emphasized that a proclamation is a fundamental requirement for jurisdiction. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the amendment to the motion of protest. While amendments to a motion of protest are generally permissible, they are not allowed if they are so radical as to virtually initiate a contest where no grounds were originally stated, particularly when filed after the statutory period for filing the protest. The proposed amendment to include the allegation of proclamation was filed 36 days after the alleged proclamation date of June 6, 1928, which is well beyond the two-week period fixed by law. As the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the original motion of protest due to the lack of an essential jurisdictional allegation, an amendment remedying this defect, made after the prescriptive period, cannot retroactively confer jurisdiction upon the court. Jurisdiction must attach at the time of the original filing, with all essential facts of a jurisdictional character properly alleged, as reiterated in Tengco vs. Jocson (43 Phil., 715). Therefore, allowing the amendment would have been tantamount to permitting a new protest to be filed outside the period fixed by law, which is impermissible.
Main Doctrine
The existence of a proclamation of an elected candidate is an essential fact of a jurisdictional character that must appear in the motion of protest; otherwise, the court does not acquire jurisdiction, and this defect cannot be cured by an amendment filed after the lapse of the statutory period for filing an election protest.