Tayko v. Capistrano
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns election protests and criminal cases related to the general election of June 5, 1928, in the Province of Oriental Negros. Petitioners, including Felipe Tayko and others, are parties to these cases, which involve alleged violations of election law. 2. Procedural History: The case originated in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, presided over by respondent Judge Nicolas Capistrano. An auxiliary judge, Sixto de la Costa, was also assigned to the province. Petitioners allege an understanding that the auxiliary judge would handle election matters, while the respondent judge would handle ordinary cases. However, the respondent judge proceeded to take cognizance of the election cases, leading to the current petition. 3. The Petition: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the respondent judge from hearing election cases. Petitioners argue that the respondent judge is disqualified due to reaching the age of 65, rendering him neither a judge de jure nor de facto. They also claim he actively participated in the filing of criminal charges against them, exceeding his authority. The respondents demurred, asserting that the judge's title to office cannot be questioned via prohibition and that he is at least a de facto judge whose acts are valid.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge, having reached the age of 65, is disqualified from hearing cases. Whether an "understanding" regarding the distribution of cases divests a judge of jurisdiction. Whether the respondent judge's active participation in filing criminal charges, including appointing a deputy fiscal, disqualifies him from trying the cases. Whether the respondent judge is a de facto judge whose title to office cannot be questioned by prohibition.
Ruling
The demurrer to the petition is sustained, and the proceedings are dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the respondent judge reaching the age of 65 and disqualification: While it is evident that the respondent judge, having reached the age of 65, is no longer a judge de jure under Section 148 of the Administrative Code as amended, he is still considered a judge de facto. A de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto. The title to the office of a judge, whether de jure or de facto, can only be determined in a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto and cannot be tested by prohibition. Therefore, this ground does not divest him of jurisdiction in the manner sought by the petitioners. On the issue of the "understanding" regarding case distribution: A mere "understanding" as to the distribution of cases for trial did not deprive the respondent judge of the jurisdiction conferred upon him by law. Prohibition lies only in cases where a judge acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, and a mere agreement on case assignment does not constitute such a lack of jurisdiction. It was not alleged that another judge had taken cognizance of the cases or that they had been definitively assigned to trial before such other judge, further weakening this argument. On the issue of the respondent judge's active participation in filing criminal charges: The respondent judge's active interest and participation in the filing of criminal charges, including the appointment of a deputy fiscal when the regular provincial fiscal refused to file informations for lack of sufficient evidence, did not disqualify him from trying the case. Section 1679 of the Administrative Code allows the judge to appoint an acting provincial fiscal when the regular fiscal is disqualified or unable to discharge duties. The determination of whether the fiscal failed to discharge their duty lies within the sound discretion of the presiding judge, and there was no allegation of abuse of discretion. Thus, in appointing an acting fiscal, the respondent judge acted within his jurisdiction. On the issue of whether the respondent judge is a de facto judge whose title cannot be questioned by prohibition: The respondent judge, having been duly appointed and continuing to exercise the duties of his office under color of such appointment, even if his term may have expired and he is no longer de jure, must be considered a judge de facto. This is especially true as his successor has not been appointed, and good faith is presumed, leading to the conclusion that he is holding over in good faith. The principle is well-established that the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure judge concerning the public or third persons. The legality of his assumption of office can only be attacked by the sovereign power through a quo warranto proceeding, not by private suitors through a writ of prohibition.
Main Doctrine
The title to the office of a judge, whether de jure or de facto, can only be determined in a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto and cannot be tested by prohibition. A de facto judge, who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto, even if their term has expired and successor not appointed, is considered to be holding over in good faith, and their official acts are valid for all purposes as those of a de jure judge concerning the public or third persons.