Selerio v. Bancasan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Nieves Selerio executed a Deed of Transfer and Waiver of Rights over a parcel of land in favor of Tregidio Bancasan for ₱200,000.00, with 50% paid and the balance payable upon Nieves vacating the premises by April 30, 1994. Subsequently, Jose Selerio and Cecilia Ababo filed a case claiming to be illegitimate children of Nieves' husband. In a Compromise Agreement dated September 2, 1997, approved by the RTC, the parties agreed to proceed with the sale of the property to respondent spouses. Procedural History: On February 2, 2007, respondent sent a demand letter for petitioners to vacate. On February 28, 2007, respondent filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession. Petitioners countered that Nieves was forced to sign the Deed due to dire need of money, illness, and lack of knowledge of its contents, and that the Deed should be treated as a contract to sell. They raised the affirmative defense of prescription, arguing that the action, filed on March 14, 2007 (amended to Feb 28, 2007 in the complaint), was filed more than 12 years after the April 30, 1994 deadline. The RTC dismissed the Complaint, holding the action had prescribed as it was filed almost 13 years after the deadline. The CA reversed, holding the action was filed within the prescriptive period and that respondent's cause of action accrued on February 2, 2007, when petitioners refused to vacate despite demand, as their possession was by mere tolerance. The CA remanded the case to the RTC for trial on the merits. The Petition: Petitioners seek review of the CA's Decision and Resolution, arguing that the CA erred in reversing the RTC's dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription.
Issue(s)
Whether or not respondent's cause of action for recovery of possession has prescribed. Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint solely on the ground of prescription without ruling on petitioners' alternative defenses; and whether the CA's pronouncements on the validity of the sale and ownership were premature.
Ruling
The Court denied the petition, affirming that the action has not prescribed. The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits, with a directive to resolve the dispute with immediate dispatch.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court agreed with the CA that the action has not prescribed, albeit for a different reason. The RTC erred in holding that no sale was perfected, as a contract of sale is perfected by mere consent. Payment of the price is for performance, not perfection. While the Deed suggests a perfected sale, its validity was not proven. The RTC dismissed the complaint solely on prescription without ruling on alternative defenses. The CA's unqualified statements regarding the validity of the sale and constructive delivery were premature. However, the Court found that the cause of action to enforce the Deed accrued on May 1, 1994, when petitioners breached the agreement by failing to vacate by April 30, 1994. Pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, respondent had 10 years from May 1, 1994, to file an action. This prescriptive period was interrupted by the Compromise Agreement dated September 2, 1997, which constituted a written acknowledgment of the obligation and created a fresh prescriptive period from September 2, 1997, to September 2, 2007. The written extrajudicial demand on February 2, 2007, further interrupted the period, making the Complaint filed on February 28, 2007, well within the prescriptive period. On the RTC's dismissal and CA's premature pronouncements: The Court clarified that the RTC's dismissal solely on prescription, without ruling on petitioners' alternative defenses (fraud, undue influence, mistake), violated petitioners' due process rights as they were not given an opportunity to present evidence for these defenses. The CA's unqualified pronouncements on the validity of the sale and ownership were also premature as these were disputed facts to be proven during trial. The CA correctly remanded the case to the RTC for trial on the merits.
Main Doctrine
The prescriptive period for an action based on a written contract is interrupted by a written extrajudicial demand or a written acknowledgment of the obligation, thereby creating a fresh prescriptive period from the date of such interruption.