Terocel Realty v. Mempin
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In an unlawful detainer case, Civil Case No. 166014, Terocel Realty, Inc. (now Pechaten Corporation) obtained a favorable decision from the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28, on April 26, 2000, ordering Leonardo Mempin to vacate the subject property. This decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Manila, on August 10, 2001. Following the finality of the RTC decision, Terocel Realty moved for execution on September 13, 2001. Mempin opposed, asserting he was a prospective beneficiary of an expropriation case then being pursued by the City of Manila, which included the disputed lot. The RTC initially granted the writ of execution, but Mempin later brought to the court's attention the expropriation complaint filed by the City of Manila. Procedural History: The expropriation case, SP No. 03-108565, was eventually dismissed, with the dismissal affirmed by the Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme Court, with the latter's decree becoming final and executory on August 6, 2012. Terocel Realty then filed another motion for execution with the MeTC-Branch 28 on February 15, 2013, over twelve years after the RTC decision became final. The MeTC denied this motion, citing that it was filed beyond the five-year prescriptive period for execution by motion and that the expropriation case was not a supervening event that tolled this period, especially since Mempin was not a party to that case. The MeTC's denial was upheld by the RTC-Manila via a petition for mandamus, which ruled that mandamus would not lie to direct a lower court on how to resolve a motion for execution. The Court of Appeals affirmed this, reiterating that the expropriation case was not a supervening event and that mandamus could not compel execution beyond the statutory limits. The Petition: Petitioner Terocel Realty, Inc. (now Pechaten Corporation) seeks review of the Court of Appeals' Decision dated July 23, 2015, and Resolution dated March 8, 2016, which affirmed the dismissal of its petition for mandamus. The petitioner argues before this Court that the expropriation case and the subsequent writ of possession constituted supervening events that suspended the five-year period for execution of judgment by motion in the unlawful detainer case. The respondent, Leonardo Mempin, counters that the two cases are distinct and that mandamus is not a proper remedy to compel execution of judgment beyond the prescribed periods. The core issues presented are whether the expropriation complaint was a supervening event interrupting the five-year period for execution by motion and whether mandamus lies to compel execution beyond this period.
Issue(s)
Did the complaint for expropriation constitute a supervening event which had the effect of interrupting the five-year period for execution of judgment by motion in the unlawful detainer case? Does mandamus lie to compel execution of judgment by motion beyond the five-year period?
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision dated July 23, 2015, and Resolution dated March 8, 2016, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 137368 are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of supervening event and interruption of the five-year period for execution by motion: The Court held that the filing of the expropriation case did not constitute a supervening event that interrupted or suspended the five-year period for execution by motion. The Court reiterated the principle that in ejectment cases, the issue is possession, while in eminent domain cases, the issue is the State's taking of property, and a decision in one does not necessarily affect the other. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that exceptional cases where execution by motion was allowed after the five-year period involved situations where the judicial debtor caused the delay for their personal benefit. In this case, respondent, as the judicial debtor, had no hand in the filing of the expropriation complaint, the issuance of any writ of execution, or any pronouncement regarding the property. Respondent was not even a party to the expropriation case nor a recognized beneficiary. Therefore, the filing of the expropriation case did not serve to toll the prescriptive period for execution by motion. On the issue of whether mandamus lies to compel execution of judgment beyond the five-year period: The Court ruled that mandamus is not a proper remedy to compel execution of judgment beyond the statutory limits. A writ of mandamus may only issue when there is a clear legal duty to perform an act and a clear legal right to its performance. In this case, petitioner was no longer entitled to execution by motion or by independent action because its right to do so was already barred by prescription. The Court stated that it is the duty of the courts not to enforce a stale judgment. Therefore, compelling the MeTC to issue a writ of execution beyond the five-year prescriptive period, which had already expired, would be contrary to law and jurisprudence, and thus, mandamus would not lie.
Main Doctrine
A motion for execution of judgment filed beyond the five-year prescriptive period is barred by prescription, and the filing of an expropriation case involving the subject property does not constitute a supervening event that tolls this period, especially when the respondent was not a party to the expropriation case and did not cause the delay. Mandamus will not lie to compel execution of a judgment that is already barred by prescription.