Department of Trade and Industry v. Enriquez

G.R. No. 225301 · 2020-06-02 · J. J.C. REYES, JR., J.: · Primary: Administrative Law; Secondary: Civil Service
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Prompted by a news report detailing corrupt practices in the issuance of importation clearances by a high-ranking Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) official, then-DTI Secretary Adrian Cristobal, Jr. directed Consumer Protection Group Undersecretary Victorino Mario Dimagiba to investigate. Usec. Dimagiba's initial findings indicated unauthorized issuances by respondent Danilo B. Enriquez, then Director of the Fair Trade and Enforcement Bureau (FTEB), suggesting sufficient basis to file administrative and/or criminal complaints against Enriquez and recommending his preventive suspension. Procedural History: Following Usec. Dimagiba's findings, Secretary Cristobal created a Special Investigation Committee (SIC) through Department Order No. 16-34 to conduct a full investigation of Enriquez, granting the SIC authority to issue preventive suspension orders. Enriquez, however, repeatedly questioned the SIC's authority and the regularity of the investigation, asserting that the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) held disciplinary jurisdiction over him as a presidential appointee. Despite his objections, the SIC issued a Show Cause Memorandum, followed by a Formal Charge for Gross Insubordination, Gross Misconduct/Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Abuse of Authority, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and placed Enriquez under preventive suspension. Enriquez then filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The Petition: The RTC granted Enriquez's petition in part, nullifying the Formal Charge and Preventive Suspension and ordering his reinstatement. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), represented by its Secretary, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The DTI argued that the Secretary possesses disciplinary jurisdiction over subordinates, including presidential appointees, and that the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the case. The DTI also contended that due process was observed. Enriquez argued that the petition was moot due to his separation from service and that the DTI lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court considered whether the DTI Secretary has disciplinary jurisdiction over presidential appointees, whether the RTC erred in its jurisdiction, and if the case was mooted by Enriquez's separation from service.

Issue(s)

I. Does the Department Secretary have disciplinary jurisdiction over a presidential appointee? II. Did the RTC err in giving due course to the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus? III. Is the petition rendered moot and academic by the expiration of Enriquez's term of service?

Ruling

The Supreme Court GRANTED the Petition, REVERSED and SET ASIDE the Decision of the RTC, and ORDERED the DTI to proceed with its investigation on Danilo B. Enriquez's administrative case, forwarding its findings and recommendations to the Office of the President for the imposition of proper penalties.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue I (Disciplinary Jurisdiction over Presidential Appointees): The Court held that the Department Secretary has the authority to investigate subordinates, including presidential appointees, and to designate a committee for such purpose, as provided by Section 7(5) of the Administrative Code of 1987. This power to investigate does not, however, include the power to impose penalties on presidential appointees, which remains with the President or the Ombudsman. The Court clarified that while the Administrative Code grants the Secretary disciplinary jurisdiction, this is limited to investigating and recommending actions, not adjudicating or imposing penalties on presidential appointees. The Court distinguished this from the disciplinary jurisdiction over non-presidential appointees, where the Secretary's decision might be final for certain penalties or appealable to the Civil Service Commission. The Court emphasized that Executive Orders creating specific bodies like the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) or its successors do not repeal the Administrative Code but rather provide specific tracks for investigating presidential appointees, and these do not divest the Department Secretary of the inherent power to initiate investigations. On Issue II (RTC's Jurisdiction): The Court ruled that the RTC erred in giving due course to Enriquez's petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The Court clarified that the DTI Secretary's act of investigating a subordinate, even a presidential appointee, is an executive or administrative function, not a judicial or quasi-judicial one. Therefore, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is directed against tribunals, boards, or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, was not the proper remedy. The Court noted that while the RTC has jurisdiction over certain petitions against officers, the nature of the DTI Secretary's action here did not fall within the scope of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus as traditionally understood or even under the expanded certiorari jurisdiction, as it did not involve a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. On Issue III (Mootness): The Court held that the petition was not rendered moot and academic by Enriquez's separation from service. The Court cited jurisprudence stating that administrative proceedings against a public officer are not mooted by their subsequent separation from service, as penalties short of dismissal may still be imposed. The Court explained that the administrative case had already progressed to the filing of a formal charge before Enriquez's term expired, and the proceedings could continue to determine guilt and impose appropriate penalties. The Court reiterated that jurisdiction is retained even if the respondent ceases to be in office, for purposes of vindication or imposing sanctions, thus preserving public policy against corrupt officials.

Main Doctrine

The Department Secretary has the authority to investigate subordinates, including presidential appointees, and to designate a committee for such purpose. However, the power to impose penalties on presidential appointees rests with the President or the Ombudsman, not the Department Secretary.

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