Roy v. Ombudsman
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In January 2006, the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) sought to purchase a vehicle with specific technical requirements for its Open University Distance Learning Program. The request was approved, and after a supply officer indicated that only a Hyundai Starex van met the specifications, a purchase application was prepared. Funds were certified as available, and the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) was directed to determine the applicability of alternative procurement methods. Despite a pre-procurement conference allocating the budget, the procurement process did not involve public bidding or advertisement as required by Republic Act No. 9184. Instead, quotations were solicited from dealers, and the BAC recommended direct contracting, a recommendation subsequently approved by the acting PLM President, Jose M. Roy III, who then signed the purchase order for the Hyundai Starex van. Procedural History: Following the purchase, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued a Notice of Suspension in March 2010, citing several irregularities, including the lack of approval from the Board of Regents for the contract, the award, the Annual Procurement Plan, and the resort to alternative procurement. The COA also noted that the conditions for direct contracting were not met and that the purchase was made from a different dealer than initially recommended. Subsequently, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman instituted a complaint in August 2013 against petitioner Roy III and other PLM officials for criminal and administrative liabilities. In November 2015, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict the petitioner and others for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration, based on a subsequent Notice of Settlement of Suspension/Disallowance/Charge from the COA, was denied by the Ombudsman in April 2016. The Petition: Petitioner Jose M. Roy III filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on August 2, 2016, seeking to annul the Ombudsman's Resolution and Joint Order. He argued that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict him. The petition contended that the elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 were not present, specifically the acts of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and that no undue injury or unwarranted benefit was caused. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation and Motion, recommended that the Court grant the petition and dismiss the case against the petitioner.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the elements of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and undue injury or unwarranted benefits were not sufficiently established.
Ruling
The Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Resolution dated November 9, 2015, and the Joint Order dated April 29, 2016 of the Office of the Ombudsman. Accordingly, the criminal case against the Petitioner before the Sandiganbayan was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: The Court ruled that the second and third elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 were lacking. The first element, that the accused is a public officer discharging an official function, was present as petitioner was the acting president of PLM. However, the second element, which requires the act to be done with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, was not sufficiently established. The Court clarified that manifest partiality is a clear inclination to favor one side, evident bad faith implies a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing, and gross negligence is the want of even slight care. The petitioner's participation was limited to approving the BAC's recommendation, and his signature on the BAC Resolution and Purchase Order did not automatically infer malice or fraudulent intent, especially when he had no direct participation in the selection of dealers or the procurement proceedings. The Court cited Sistoza v. Desierto and Arias v. Sandiganbayan to emphasize that a signature on a document does not automatically equate to evident bad faith or gross negligence, particularly when the official relies on the expertise of subordinate committees like the BAC, given the volume of work and the presumption of good faith. Furthermore, the third element, causing undue injury to any party or giving unwarranted benefits to a private party, was also found to be lacking. The Court noted that the PLM purchased the vehicle according to the specifications and allocated budget, and there was no evidence of actual injury to the government or unwarranted benefit to any private party. Even assuming negligence on the part of the petitioner for relying on the BAC, such omissions were attributed to mere inadvertence, over-eagerness, or misplaced confidence in subordinates, which at worst would constitute simple negligence, not gross inexcusable negligence. The Court reiterated the principle from Arias v. Sandiganbayan that heads of offices cannot be expected to personally examine every single detail of every transaction, and must rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates. Therefore, without manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and without proof of undue injury or unwarranted benefits, there is no probable cause to file an information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Court also considered the COA's subsequent Notice of Settlement of Suspension/Disallowance/Charge (NSSDC) as a factor, although it acknowledged that administrative findings are generally not binding on criminal proceedings, the absence of probable cause in this instance warranted interference with the Ombudsman's finding.
Main Doctrine
The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as the elements of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, and the consequent undue injury or unwarranted benefits, were not sufficiently established.