Favis-Velasco v. Gonzales
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case originated from a complaint-affidavit filed by Ramona Favis-Velasco and Elvira L. Yulo (petitioners) against Jaye Marjorie Rojas Gonzales (respondent Jaye), her husband Bienvenido Ma. Gonzales III, and Raul Clemente. The petitioners accused the respondents of 35 counts of Estafa by unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and 35 counts of Estafa by false pretenses under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. Procedural History: The complaint was initially dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor Gilbert R. Alcala for lack of probable cause. However, the Secretary of Justice modified this resolution, directing the filing of Informations for Estafa against respondent Jaye, while dismissing the complaint against the other respondents. Respondent Jaye then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA granted Jaye's petition, annulling the DOJ Secretary's resolution and reinstating the dismissal of the complaint. The petitioners sought reconsideration, which the CA denied, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court. The Petition: The petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the CA's decision. They argue that the CA erred in finding no probable cause for Estafa under Article 315, paragraphs 2(a) and 1(b) of the RPC, and that the CA wrongly ruled that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause. The core issue is whether there is sufficient probable cause to indict respondent Jaye for Estafa.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding no probable cause for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding no probable cause for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice in finding probable cause.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) (False Pretenses): The Supreme Court found that the petitioners failed to sufficiently allege all the elements of Estafa by false pretenses. Specifically, the Court noted that the petitioners themselves stated that they first heard about respondent Jaye through a mutual friend, Marianne Onate, who introduced respondent Jaye as her broker. The Court reasoned that it was through Onate's representation that petitioners would earn substantial amounts in the stock market that induced them to invest, and thus, no deceit or fraud could be attributed to respondent Jaye that would induce them to part with their money. The Court emphasized that the false pretense or fraudulent representation must be made prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, and in this instance, the petitioners were already induced by a third party's representation. On the issue of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) (Misappropriation): The Court found no probable cause for Estafa through misappropriation. The elements require the offender's receipt of money in trust or under an obligation to return it, followed by misappropriation or conversion to the prejudice of another, and a demand for return. The Court pointed out that the checks issued by the petitioners were payable to B.A. Securities, Inc. or DAMSI, not to respondent Jaye personally, and the money was deposited into the accounts of these companies, not respondent Jaye's personal bank account. Therefore, the Court concluded that respondent Jaye could not have appropriated the invested amounts as they were never deposited in her personal account, negating the element of misappropriation. On the issue of Grave Abuse of Discretion by the Secretary of Justice: The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court reiterated that while the determination of probable cause is an executive function, it will interfere if there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In this case, the Court found that the Secretary of Justice erred in finding probable cause when the elements of the crimes charged were not sufficiently alleged or supported by evidence, particularly regarding the lack of personal receipt and misappropriation by respondent Jaye, and the absence of direct deceit attributable to her for the initial inducement to invest.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding that there was no probable cause to indict respondent Jaye Marjorie R. Gonzales for Estafa under Article 315, paragraphs 1(b) and 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, holding that not all the elements of the said crimes were sufficiently alleged in the complaint-affidavit.