Buencamino v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino, then Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Bulacan, was charged with two counts of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The first charge alleged he caused undue injury to Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation (RMDC) by collecting "pass way" fees of P1,000.00 per truck, knowing the collection was not legally sanctioned as the relevant municipal resolution had been declared null and void. The second charge alleged he ordered the apprehension and impounding of RMDC's delivery trucks for failure to pay these illegal fees. The prosecution presented evidence that the Mayor asked RMDC's president to pay the fee, authorized a certain Robert Tabarnero to collect it, and ordered the impounding of trucks. The defense argued that the Mayor acted in good faith, relying on information from the Municipal Treasurer and Sangguniang Bayan Secretary that the collection was legal, and that he was unaware of the resolution's nullification. The defense also claimed the impounding order was not from the Mayor and that Tabarnero was a job order employee authorized for accommodation purposes. Procedural History: The Sandiganbayan found the Mayor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month to eight (8) years, and perpetual disqualification from public office for each count. The Sandiganbayan found evident bad faith and undue injury, noting the Mayor's act of imposing fees without authority and authorizing a private person for collection. The Petition: The Mayor filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing the Sandiganbayan's decision. He argued that he was convicted based on inadmissible photocopied documents, that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that he was convicted of a mode of commission (gross inexcusable negligence) not alleged in the Informations, violating his right to be informed of the accusation.
Issue(s)
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting the petitioner of two counts of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019; and whether there was a variance between the mode of commission alleged in the Information (evident bad faith) and the mode of commission on which the conviction was based (gross inexcusable negligence). Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner acted with evident bad faith. Whether the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution was admissible and had sufficient probative value.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Sandiganbayan's decision, and acquitted the petitioner. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Variance of the Mode of Commission: The Court held that the Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner based on gross inexcusable negligence, which was distinct from the charge of evident bad faith alleged in the Informations. This variance violated the petitioner's constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. The Court emphasized that evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence are separate modalities of committing the offense under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and an allegation of one does not include the other. Convicting on a different modality deprives the accused of the opportunity to defend himself against the new accusation. The Court cited Villarosa v. People to underscore that convicting on the basis of gross inexcusable negligence when charged only with evident bad faith is unconstitutional. On the Element of Evident Bad Faith: Even assuming no variance, the Court found insufficient evidence to prove evident bad faith. The Court agreed with the petitioner that several documentary evidence offered by the prosecution were inadmissible hearsay, violating the Best Evidence Rule, as they were mere photocopies to which timely objections were made. These documents were offered to prove the truth of their contents, not an independent fact. The Court criticized the Sandiganbayan for failing to rule on these objections and for admitting inadmissible evidence. Furthermore, even if admitted, the Court found that the evidence did not establish a "palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose" but rather an "honest albeit erroneous reliance on a defunct legal authority." The petitioner consistently testified that he was unaware of the revocation of the municipal resolution and relied on assurances from the Municipal Treasurer and Sangguniang Bayan Secretary. His authorization of Tabarnero was explained as an accommodation for RMDC's convenience, and his role in computation was limited to implementing existing ordinances. On the Admissibility and Probative Value of Evidence: The Court found that key documentary evidence, including photocopies of resolutions and a DILG Preliminary Report, were inadmissible hearsay and violated the Best Evidence Rule because timely objections were raised. The Court noted that these documents were offered to prove the truth of their contents, which went to the heart of the accusation. The Court also found that even if admitted, the evidence lacked probative value to establish evident bad faith. The Court pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove the petitioner's authorship of the memorandum ordering the impounding of trucks, as his signature was absent, and the blotter entry was insufficient corroborative evidence. The Court also noted that the collected fees were remitted to the Municipal Treasury and not misappropriated.
Main Doctrine
A conviction for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of all its elements, including the specific mode of commission alleged in the Information. A conviction based on a mode of commission (e.g., gross inexcusable negligence) different from that charged (e.g., evident bad faith) violates the accused's right to due process. Furthermore, inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay photocopies objected to on the ground of violating the Best Evidence Rule, cannot be the basis for conviction.