Melgar v. Delgado
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns a dispute between Ines Melgar and Pedro Noel (plaintiffs-appellees) and Tomas Delgado and Alberta Alquizola (defendants-appellants). The specific nature of the underlying dispute or crime is not detailed in the provided text, but it resulted in a judgment against the appellants. Procedural History: Following a judgment against the appellants, they filed a bill of exceptions and a brief. The appellees moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the bill of exceptions was untimely. The appellants had filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial 20 years after being notified of the original judgment, citing insufficient evidence and that the judgment was contrary to law. This motion was denied on August 18, 1928, with oral notification to the appellants. Written notification of this denial was not provided until September 13, 1928, on which date the appellants reiterated their exception and filed their bill of exceptions, which was approved by the court on November 7, 1928. The Petition: The appellees' motion to dismiss hinges on the argument that the period for filing the bill of exceptions should commence from the oral notification of the denial of the motion for a new trial on August 18, 1928, rendering the September 13, 1928 filing untimely. The appellants contend that the period should only begin from the written notification on September 13, 1928, as court orders must be in writing to be officially recorded and to trigger the appeal period, especially when the motion for a new trial is based on insufficiency of evidence, which requires a written ruling reviewable by the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the period within which to file a bill of exceptions in ordinary civil cases commences from the date of oral notification in open court or from the date of formal written notification of the order denying a motion for new trial.
Ruling
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The bill of exceptions was filed within the reglementary period.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the period for filing a bill of exceptions commences from the date of formal written notification of the order denying a motion for new trial, not from an oral notification in open court. This determination is rooted in several fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Firstly, Courts of First Instance are recognized as courts of record, meaning they are obligated to maintain a written record of all their proceedings and orders for a perpetual memorial and testimony, as defined in 2 Cyc., 657-658. Consequently, an order cannot be deemed effectively notified until it has been formally reduced to writing and officially filed within the clerk's office. Secondly, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of the Courts of First Instance explicitly mandates that "as soon as an order, decree or decision is filed by a judge, the clerk shall give notice of registered mail or personally to both parties or their attorneys," thereby demonstrating that oral notifications in open court do not constitute the official notification required by the rules. Thirdly, Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 1596, provides that an exception may be taken to an order overruling a motion for new trial on grounds of insufficient evidence, and such exception may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. This statutory provision implicitly requires that the ruling on a motion for new trial be made in writing to facilitate proper review by the appellate court, as an oral ruling could not be adequately reviewed. Therefore, the Court concluded that since the order denying the motion for new trial was filed in the clerk's office and formally notified to the appellants only on September 13, 1928, their subsequent actions on the same date, including announcing their intention to appeal and filing their bill of exceptions, were all within the prescribed period in accordance with existing doctrines.
Main Doctrine
The period within which to file a bill of exceptions begins to run from the date of written notice of the order denying a motion for a new trial, not from the date of oral notification in open court.