People v. Montil
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Provincial Fiscal of Leyte filed an information charging Cirilo Montil with a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1927, of Pastrana, Leyte. The charge alleged that the accused willfully and unlawfully sold pork outside of the public market, specifically in the sitio of Iraya. Procedural History: The defendant filed a demurrer to the information, contending that the ordinance was illegal, unreasonable, and contrary to the Jones Law. The lower court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the information. The fiscal appealed the dismissal. The Petition: The People of the Philippine Islands appealed the decision of the lower court, arguing that it erred in sustaining the demurrer.
Issue(s)
Whether the municipal ordinance prohibiting the sale of pork outside of the public market is valid. Whether the said ordinance is illegal, unreasonable, and contrary to the Jones Law.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, holding that the municipal council had the power to enact the ordinance in question, that it is not in conflict with the Jones Law, and that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the municipal ordinance prohibiting the sale of pork outside of the public market: The Court held that a municipal corporation may prohibit by ordinance the sale of marketable articles within certain limits or during certain hours except at the established market, when authorized by the Legislature. This power is typically derived from the general power to establish and regulate markets. The Court cited Corpus Juris, which states that such restrictive regulations are generally permissible under the power to establish and regulate markets, especially when adequate market facilities are furnished. The ordinance in question was deemed a proper regulation of trade, not an unreasonable restraint, and fell within the scope of the power granted to municipal corporations. The Court referenced its own previous rulings in United States vs. Chan Tienco and United States vs. Toribio as supporting this principle. On whether the ordinance is illegal, unreasonable, and contrary to the Jones Law: The Court found that the ordinance was not in conflict with the Jones Law. The authority for such ordinances stems from statutory powers granted to municipal councils, such as the power to establish and regulate markets, as provided in section 39(q) of the Municipal Code. The Court concluded that the municipal council possessed the power to enact the ordinance and that it was a valid exercise of police power aimed at securing pure food and protecting public health and comfort. The Court explicitly stated that the lower court erred in sustaining the demurrer on these grounds.
Main Doctrine
A municipal council has the power to enact an ordinance prohibiting the sale of pork outside of the public market, provided adequate market facilities are furnished, as such regulation is a proper exercise of police power and not an unreasonable restraint of trade or in conflict with the Jones Law.