Ordoña v. Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The petitioner, Richelle Busque Ordoña, was married to Ariel O. Libut in October 2000. After separating from her husband in 2008 due to his infidelity, she worked abroad where she met Allan D. Fulgueras. Their intimate relationship resulted in her pregnancy. She returned to the Philippines and gave birth to a son, Alrich Paul Ordoña Fulgueras, on January 26, 2010. The Certificate of Live Birth listed Allan D. Fulgueras as the father and included an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity purportedly signed by him. 2. Procedural History: The petitioner filed a verified petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. She sought to change her son's surname from Fulgueras to Ordoña and to delete the paternal information. The RTC denied the petition, finding that Alrich Paul was an illegitimate child and that the Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity, being a public instrument, established his use of Allan Fulgueras' surname. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC, ruling that Alrich Paul was presumed legitimate as he was conceived during the petitioner's subsisting marriage to Ariel Libut, and that the legitimacy could only be impugned in a direct action by the husband or his heirs. The CA directed the Civil Registrar to enter "Libut" as the child's surname and disregard the Affidavit of Acknowledgment. 3. The Petition: The petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the CA's decision. She argues that the CA erred in presuming legitimacy and in not allowing the correction of entries under Rule 108. The core of her argument is that Allan D. Fulgueras did not sign the Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity, as he was abroad at the time of the child's birth, and that the child should bear her maiden surname, Ordoña, and have the paternal information deleted. The Supreme Court, however, found that the petition constituted a collateral attack on the child's legitimacy and filiation, which is impermissible in a Rule 108 proceeding. Furthermore, the Court noted that under Article 167 of the Family Code, the mother is prohibited from declaring against her child's legitimacy, and that only the husband or his heirs can impugn legitimacy in a direct action within the prescribed period.
Issue(s)
Whether the legitimacy and filiation of a child can be collaterally attacked in a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Whether a mother is a proper party to impugn the legitimacy of her child born during her valid marriage. Whether the Rule 108 petition complied with the procedural requirements for an adversarial proceeding.
Ruling
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 10, 2014 and the Resolution dated October 14, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 99381 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the verified petition for correction of entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Alrich Paul Ordoña Fulgueras.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: No, the legitimacy and filiation of a child cannot be collaterally attacked in a Rule 108 petition. The Supreme Court, citing Miller v. Miller, held that the changes sought by the petitioner were not merely clerical but substantial, as they would gravely affect the child's status and successional rights. Such matters must be threshed out in a direct action specifically filed for that purpose, not in a proceeding for correction of entries. Because the child was conceived and born while the petitioner was validly married to Ariel Libut, the child is presumed legitimate under Article 164 of the Family Code. The petitioner's attempt to declare the child as illegitimate in a Rule 108 proceeding is a prohibited collateral attack on this presumed legitimacy. On Issue 2: No, a mother is not a proper party to impugn her child's legitimacy. The Court emphasized the explicit prohibition under Article 167 of the Family Code, which states, '[t]he child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.' The right to impugn a child's legitimacy is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs, as provided under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code. Citing Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, the Court affirmed that this legal mandate cannot be subverted by the mother. Therefore, the presumption of legitimacy stands in the absence of a direct action timely filed by the proper party. On Issue 3: No, the petition failed to comply with procedural requirements. The Court ruled that even if the Rule 108 petition were to be considered a direct action, it would still fail. The substantial corrections sought required an adversarial proceeding. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 108 mandate that all persons who have or claim any interest that would be affected must be impleaded as indispensable parties. In this case, Ariel Libut, the petitioner's husband and the child's presumed father, was not impleaded. His status and hereditary rights would be directly and adversely affected by the petition, making him an indispensable party. The failure to implead him rendered all subsequent proceedings, including any judgment, ineffectual.
Main Doctrine
The legitimacy and filiation of a child cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The law presumes a child conceived or born during a valid marriage to be legitimate under Article 164 of the Family Code. This presumption can only be impugned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, which, under Article 170 of the Family Code, is strictly limited to the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. The mother is explicitly barred by Article 167 of the Family Code from declaring against her child's legitimacy.