Quiogue v. Estacio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Luis G. Quiogue filed a complaint-affidavit against respondent Benito F. Estacio, Jr. before the Office of the Ombudsman. Quiogue alleged that Estacio, a member of the board of directors and concurrent Vice-President of Independent Realty Corporation Group of Companies (IRC), a sequestered corporation supervised by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). This violation allegedly occurred when Estacio received separation benefits, 14th-month pay, and an extra bonus totaling P544,178.20, which Quiogue contended caused undue injury to the government. Quiogue argued that PCGG-nominated directors were restricted by Memorandum Circulars (MC) No. 40 and MC No. 66, Series of 1993, limiting their allowances and prohibiting them from assuming line functions or other positions without prior authorization, and that any benefits received should be returned to the National Treasury. Procedural History: The Office of the Ombudsman, in a Resolution dated October 13, 2014, dismissed Quiogue's complaint for lack of probable cause. While the Ombudsman found IRC to be a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) and Estacio to be a public officer, it ruled that his actions did not constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. The Ombudsman reasoned that Estacio's receipt of benefits was not in the performance of judicial, administrative, or official functions, and that the board resolution granting separation benefits to all corporate officers was passed in good faith and was not contrary to IRC's by-laws. The Ombudsman further noted that MC Nos. 40 and 66 were not applicable to Estacio's situation, especially considering MC No. 175, Series of 1998, which governs directors with pre-approved line functions. The Ombudsman denied Quiogue's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 10, 2015. The Petition: Petitioner Luis G. Quiogue filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution and Order. Quiogue imputed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman for its alleged unjust refusal to file the appropriate Information against Estacio. Quiogue argued that Estacio's participation in the approval of the board resolution and his receipt of the emoluments constituted evident bad faith, thereby violating Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. The Supreme Court, however, found the petition unmeritorious, affirming the Ombudsman's findings that Estacio was a public officer but that his actions did not demonstrate manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence as required to establish a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint against respondent Estacio for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Whether respondent Estacio, as a director of a sequestered corporation, is considered a public officer under RA No. 3019. Whether Estacio's participation in the approval of the board resolution granting separation benefits and his receipt thereof constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, specifically through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, affirming the Resolution dated October 13, 2014, and Order dated March 10, 2015, issued by the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-12-0288-G.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion: The Court held that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman's power to investigate and prosecute is plenary and discretionary, and the Court generally defers to its findings on probable cause unless there is a showing of capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary exercise of judgment. In this case, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman's resolution finding no probable cause was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman correctly determined that Estacio was a public officer but found no violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 based on the facts presented. The Court reiterated that a mere disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. On whether Estacio is a public officer: The Court affirmed the Ombudsman's finding that Estacio is a public officer. While IRC was organized under the Corporation Code, it is a sequestered corporation under the fiscal supervision of the PCGG and a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) under the direct supervision of the Office of the President. The Court cited the definition of GOCC under Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 3(o) of RA No. 10149, and the three requisites for an entity to be considered a GOCC: (1) organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, (2) vested with functions relating to public needs, and (3) owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. IRC met all these requisites, and Estacio, appointed by the President's recommendation, was invested with sovereign functions for public benefit, thus qualifying him as a public officer. On whether Estacio's actions constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019: The Court agreed with the Ombudsman that there was no violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. The offense under Section 3(e) can be committed through dolo (evident bad faith or manifest partiality) or culpa (gross inexcusable negligence). The Court found no evidence of evident bad faith on Estacio's part. The board resolution granting separation benefits was a corporate act, and Estacio was one of several directors. The resolution recognized that it was equitable to grant the same benefits to officers as those previously enjoyed by employees. There was no showing that Estacio was unduly favored or that he was spurred by a corrupt motive or ill will. The benefits received were incidental to his position, and there is no presumption of bad faith in cases involving RA No. 3019. The Court emphasized that mistakes, even if patent, are not actionable absent a clear showing of malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to protect the innocent from hasty and oppressive prosecution, and the Ombudsman correctly determined that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a prima facie case.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman's dismissal of a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 against a director of a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) for lack of probable cause, finding no evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in the approval of separation benefits, as the act was a corporate resolution that recognized equitable treatment for officers similar to what was already enjoyed by employees, and any benefit derived was incidental to his position.