Javier v. Director of Lands
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On August 20, 1971, the Director of Lands initiated cadastral proceedings by filing a petition before the Court of First Instance of Mati, Davao Oriental, seeking the adjudication of title to a vast tract of land comprising 2,540.5667 hectares, divided into 1,079 lots, situated in Lupon, Davao Oriental, designated as Lupon Cadastre, Cad-353-D, Case 1. Siblings Lolita Javier and Jovito Cerna filed their respective Answers on June 25, 1974, asserting ownership over Lot No. 3541, with Javier claiming Lot No. 3541-A (22,743 sq. meters) and Cerna claiming Lot No. 3541-B (48,424 sq. meters). Procedural History: After a significant delay, Javier and Cerna filed a Motion to Set Case for Hearing on January 28, 2005, asserting they were the only claimants and no hearing had been set. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) set the case for hearing, and Javier testified on August 1, 2006, regarding their claim derived from a donation inter vivos from their father. The RTC admitted their evidence and later ordered a partition survey. On March 8, 2010, the RTC rendered judgment adjudicating Lot No. 3541 to Javier and Cerna. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration, alleging lack of due process and notice, which the RTC denied on February 28, 2013. The OSG then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) on March 26, 2013, questioning the RTC's jurisdiction due to alleged failure to prove publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing. The CA granted the appeal on May 31, 2017, setting aside the RTC's judgment and dismissing the cadastral case for lack of jurisdiction. The CA denied Javier and Cerna's motion for reconsideration on July 26, 2017. The Petition: Javier and Cerna filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the CA's Decision and Resolution. They argue that the jurisdictional requirement of publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was complied with in 1974 and that the CA erred in ruling that the publication requirement extends to subsequent notices. Petitioners contend that the government, having initiated the proceedings, has the duty to ensure compliance and cannot belatedly claim lack of notice. They also argue that the CA erred in not taking judicial notice of the submitted proofs of publication and that estoppel by laches should apply against the respondent, who raised the issue of jurisdiction only after 42 years and after the trial court had ruled twice against it. The core issue is whether the CA erred in finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the alleged failure to prove publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the cadastral case for failure of petitioners to show proof of publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing. Whether estoppel by laches had set in, barring the respondent from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the Petition, reinstated the March 8, 2010 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Lupon, Davao Oriental, and declared that estoppel by laches had set in, barring the respondent from questioning the trial court's jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction and proof of publication: The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The Court found that petitioners proved that the trial court's Notice of Initial Hearing dated December 10, 1973, was published twice in the Official Gazette on January 1 and 28, 1974, after the petition was filed on August 20, 1971. Compliance with the publication requirement was further evidenced by the fact that petitioners filed their Answer on June 25, 1974, within six months from the publication, as provided by Section 9 of Act No. 2259. The Court emphasized that publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette is an essential requisite for a court to acquire jurisdiction in land registration and cadastral cases, as stated in Section 7 of Act No. 2259 and reiterated in cases like Spouses Tan Sing Pan v. Republic. However, unlike in Spouses Tan Sing Pan, the petitioners in this case provided proof of publication. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider the documentary evidence, including proof of publication, submitted by petitioners on appeal, and in concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction solely on this ground. On the issue of estoppel by laches: The Court ruled that estoppel by laches had set in. While the general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter is not lost by waiver or estoppel and can be raised at any stage, equity dictates that laches may bar a party from invoking lack of jurisdiction. The respondent Director of Lands filed the petition in 1971 but the case was only revived in 2005. During the trial, the respondent, through the Public Prosecutor, actively participated but never raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and did not oppose the petitioners' motion for adjudication. The petitioners underwent surveys and subdivisions without opposition. After 39 years from the filing of the petition, judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners. The respondent only raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal to the Court of Appeals in 2013, after the trial court ruled against it twice. This delay of 42 years from the filing of the petition, coupled with active participation and seeking affirmative relief, demonstrates a failure to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the right was abandoned. To allow the respondent to question jurisdiction at this late stage would be the height of injustice and would condone its negligence, as established in cases like Tijam v. Sibonghanoy and Amoguis v. Ballado.
Main Doctrine
Estoppel by laches may bar a party from invoking the court's lack of jurisdiction, especially when the issue is raised for the first time on appeal after a considerable lapse of time and after the party has actively participated in the proceedings and obtained an adverse ruling.