Collao v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Vener D. Collao, then Barangay Chairman of Barangay 780, transacted with businessman Franco G.C. Espiritu of FRCGE Trading for the delivery of supplies for a basketball court and school/sports equipment amounting to P134,200.00. Collao allegedly demanded a 30% commission, amounting to P40,000.00, from Espiritu, which the latter acceded to. Espiritu issued a check for P40,000.00 to Collao, who signed an acknowledgment receipt for the amount. Subsequently, Espiritu completed the delivery and was paid P127,010.72. Collao was indicted for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, convicted Collao and imposed imprisonment, perpetual disqualification from public office, and ordered him to pay P40,000.00 to the private complainant. The Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Collao's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Collao filed a petition before the Supreme Court, arguing that his conviction was not based on law and established jurisprudence, and that his constitutional rights to due process and to be informed of the accusations were violated.
Issue(s)
Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Collao of violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019. Whether the Information sufficiently alleged all the elements of the crime charged, thereby complying with the requirements of due process.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated May 25, 2018, which upheld the conviction of Vener D. Collao for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ratio Decidendi
On the conviction for violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019: The Supreme Court found no reasonable doubt as to Collao's guilt. The elements of the offense were established: (1) Collao was a public officer (Barangay Chairman); (2) he requested and received a share/commission of P40,000.00; (3) for his own behalf; (4) in connection with a contract with Barangay 780 for the delivery of supplies; and (5) he had the right to intervene in his official capacity by approving the purchase order and disbursement voucher. The Court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence, including the testimony of Espiritu and Cabilan, and the documentary evidence such as the check and acknowledgment receipt. The Court rejected Collao's defense of forgery, noting the implausibility of an impostor knowing his driver's license number and impersonating him convincingly, especially when his driver's license number was on the check itself. The Court reiterated that proof of any of the three distinct acts penalized (demanding, receiving, or both) suffices for conviction. On the sufficiency of the Information and due process: The Supreme Court found Collao's argument regarding the violation of his constitutional rights to be erroneous. The Information clearly alleged all the essential elements of a violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019, including that Collao was a public officer, that he demanded/solicited and accepted P40,000.00 as a share/commission, and that this was in connection with a barangay project in which he intervened in his official capacity. The Court emphasized that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the recital of facts in the information, not its caption or the provision of law cited. The averments were sufficient to inform Collao of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, enabling him to prepare his defense. The fact that the Purchase Order date was after the check encashment was deemed an evidentiary matter, not an essential element of the crime, as the law punishes the act of requesting and/or receiving a share in connection with a contract.
Main Doctrine
The elements of violation of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) who requested or received any gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or benefit; (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person; (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government; (5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene. Proof of the existence of any of these modes of committing the offense suffices to warrant conviction.