Oliveros v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An Information for Frustrated Murder was filed against Benjamin M. Oliveros, Jr. (Benjamin) and Oliver M. Oliveros (Oliver), later amended to include Maximo Z. Sotto (Maximo). The prosecution alleged that on October 30, 2013, in the public market of Binmaley, Pangasinan, Benjamin and Oliver, in conspiracy and taking advantage of superior strength, assaulted Glenn F. Apostol (Glenn). Oliver allegedly held Glenn from behind while Benjamin hacked his face. They then mauled Glenn with Maximo. Oliver allegedly chased Glenn and hacked his shoulder. Glenn suffered hacking wounds and lacerations. The prosecution claimed these acts would have resulted in murder but were prevented by medical intervention. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69, found Benjamin, Oliver, and Maximo guilty of Frustrated Murder. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction but modified the damages awarded. The Petition: Petitioners sought review of the CA decision, arguing that the CA erred in affirming their conviction for Frustrated Murder.
Issue(s)
Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of petitioners for the crime of Frustrated Murder. Whether petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another and with abuse of superior strength. Whether intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the prosecution. Whether petitioners acted in defense of a relative and in defense of a stranger. Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation should be appreciated in favor of petitioners. Whether petitioners should be liable for Attempted Murder and not Frustrated Murder, as the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim were not proven by the prosecution to be fatal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, declaring petitioners Benjamin M. Oliveros, Jr., Oliver M. Oliveros, and Maximo Z. Sotto guilty of Attempted Murder, not Frustrated Murder. They were sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. They were also ordered to pay Glenn F. Apostol P25,000.00 each as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 each as moral damages, and P25,000.00 each as exemplary damages.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of Frustrated Murder: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners on the point of Frustrated vs. Attempted Murder, modifying the conviction to Attempted Murder. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the wounds sustained by the victim were fatal. While the wounds were serious and inflicted with intent to kill, the medico-legal officer's testimony only stated that the victim might lose blood and could possibly die from infection or tetanus without timely medical attention. The Court emphasized that for frustrated homicide or murder, the wounds must be proven to be fatal, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. Citing previous jurisprudence, the Court held that where the character of the wound is doubtful, the crime should be considered attempted, not frustrated. On the issue of conspiracy and abuse of superior strength: The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC and CA that the petitioners acted in conspiracy. This was established by their series of coordinated acts, including Oliver holding the victim while Benjamin hacked him, and their subsequent mauling and kicking of the victim. The Court reiterated that conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence but can be inferred from the series of acts performed in pursuance of a common unlawful purpose. Furthermore, the Court agreed that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime, as the offenders used bolos and numerical superiority against the unarmed victim, creating a notorious inequality of forces. On the issue of intent to kill: The Court found that the prosecution sufficiently proved the intent to kill. This was evidenced by the means used (boloses), the nature and number of wounds inflicted (three hacks, two to the face), the persistence of the attack even when the victim was wounded, and the act of chasing the victim. The Court reiterated that intent to kill can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, including the means used, the nature and location of wounds, and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. On the issue of defense of a relative/stranger: The Court rejected the petitioners' claim of acting in defense of a relative or stranger. The Court emphasized that unlawful aggression is a prerequisite for self-defense, and the defense witnesses' accounts were inconsistent and lacked credibility. Specifically, the Court noted the implausibility of Mimielyn calling for help while being carried by the victim, Oliver's claim of being knocked unconscious without visible injuries, and Benjamin's assertion that the victim was still capable of lifting Mimielyn after being hacked. The Court found no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, thus negating the possibility of self-defense. On the issue of passion or obfuscation: The Court also denied the claim of passion or obfuscation. The Court reiterated that this mitigating circumstance requires an act that is both unlawful and sufficient to produce uncontrollable passion. Due to the inconsistent testimonies and lack of clear evidence that the petitioners witnessed Glenn initiating an attack on Mimielyn, the Court found no basis for this claim. The Court stressed that the turmoil from a quarrel should not be confused with a condition of mind resulting from prior unlawful acts. On the issue of Frustrated Murder vs. Attempted Murder: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners on this point, modifying the conviction to Attempted Murder. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the wounds sustained by the victim were fatal. While the wounds were serious and inflicted with intent to kill, the medico-legal officer's testimony only stated that the victim might lose blood and could possibly die from infection or tetanus without timely medical attention. The Court emphasized that for frustrated homicide or murder, the wounds must be proven to be fatal, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. Citing previous jurisprudence, the Court held that where the character of the wound is doubtful, the crime should be considered attempted, not frustrated.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court modified the conviction from Frustrated Murder to Attempted Murder, holding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the wounds sustained by the victim were fatal, thus resolving the doubt in favor of the accused.