People v. Sabater
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Noel Sabater y Ulan was charged with violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 9165, for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) on November 4, 2016. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Naga City, as Criminal Case No. 2016-0935. Upon arraignment, the respondent pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, after the prosecution had formally offered its evidence, the respondent moved for plea bargaining, proposing to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, RA 9165 (possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs), citing A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. The prosecution opposed this motion, citing DOJ Circular No. 027, which permits plea bargaining to Section 11(3) of RA 9165 for selling less than five grams of shabu, but not to Section 12. Procedural History: The trial court granted the respondent's motion for plea bargaining, declaring DOJ Circular No. 027 contrary to the Rules of Court and an encroachment on the Supreme Court's rule-making power. The respondent's not guilty plea was vacated, and he was re-arraigned, pleading guilty to violation of Section 12, RA 9165. The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction for this lesser offense, sentencing the respondent to imprisonment and a fine. Aggrieved, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for late filing, finding it was filed 35 days beyond the reglementary period. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied. The Petition: The People, through the OSG, filed the present petition for review on certiorari, seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals' resolutions dismissing their petition. They argue that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their petition for being filed out of time, asserting that the reglementary period should have been counted from the receipt of the trial court's judgment of conviction, not its earlier order granting the plea bargain. The People contend that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by allowing the plea bargain despite the prosecution's objection and by declaring DOJ Circular No. 027 void. They argue that plea bargaining requires the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the trial court's action effectively encroached upon the government's prerogative to prosecute crimes and allowed a plea to an offense not necessarily included in the original charge. Furthermore, they argue that the trial court should have harmonized DOJ Circular No. 027 with A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC instead of declaring the circular void.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the People's petition for certiorari for belated filing. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted respondent's proposal to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, RA 9165 without the consent and over the objection of the prosecutor. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared DOJ Circular No. 027 an encroachment of the Court's rule-making power.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 28, 2019 and September 17, 2019 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 158342 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Judgment dated September 12, 2018 and the concomitant orders of the Regional Trial Court-Branch 24, Naga City in Criminal Case No. 2016-0935 are VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The trial court is ORDERED to proceed with the criminal case against respondent Noel Sabater y Ulan with utmost dispatch.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of belated filing: The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the People's petition for certiorari for belated filing. The 60-day reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the prosecution's receipt of the trial court's Judgment dated September 12, 2018, not from the earlier Order dated August 2, 2018. This is consistent with the ruling in People v. Majingcar, which clarified that the period is counted from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The Court noted that while the OSG admitted belated filing, the reckoning date used by the Court of Appeals was erroneous. The Court emphasized that interlocutory orders, such as the plea bargaining resolution, cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari; the proper remedy is to challenge the final judgment on the merits. Allowing challenges to interlocutory orders would lead to undue delay and clog appellate court dockets. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion in allowing plea bargaining without prosecutor's consent: The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved respondent's plea to a lesser offense of violation of Section 12, RA 9165, despite the vehement objection of the prosecution. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court explicitly requires the consent of the prosecutor for an accused to be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. The prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions and it is their duty to prosecute the proper offense. When the prosecution withholds consent, there is no meeting of the minds, and the trial court cannot proceed to approve the plea bargain. To do so over the prosecution's objection constitutes grave abuse of discretion, rendering the subsequent judgment void, as established in Mercury Drug Corporation v. Sps. Huang. Such a void judgment can never lapse into finality, thus falling under the exception to the doctrine of immutability of judgment. On the issue of DOJ Circular No. 027 encroaching on the Court's rule-making power: DOJ Circular No. 027 does not infringe upon the Supreme Court's rule-making power. This was categorically resolved in Sayre v. Xenos, where the Court held that A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC (the Plea Bargaining Framework) is a rule of procedure established by the Court's rule-making power. However, plea bargaining still requires mutual agreement of the parties and court approval. DOJ Circular No. 27 serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors before they give consent to proposed plea bargains and does not repeal or modify the Court's framework. The trial court's declaration that DOJ Circular No. 27 was therefore erroneous.
Main Doctrine
A trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approves a plea bargain to a lesser offense without the consent of the prosecutor, rendering the resulting judgment void. The period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the notice of the judgment of conviction, not from an earlier interlocutory order.