People v. Borras

G.R. No. 250295 · 2021-03-15 · J. LAZARO-JAVIER, J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Naci Borras y Lascano (private respondent) was charged with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), as amended by Republic Act No. 10640 (RA 10640), for selling and possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride ('shabu'). He pleaded not guilty. Procedural History: Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Estipona v. Lobrigo declaring Section 23 of RA 9165 unconstitutional, and subsequent issuances by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC) providing guidelines for plea bargaining in drug cases, the private respondent proposed to plead guilty to two counts of Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under Section 12 of RA 9165. The prosecution objected, citing DOJ Circular No. 061-17 which prohibited plea bargaining for Section 5 offenses and required such proposals to be made before the prosecution commenced its evidence presentation. The trial court, however, granted the plea bargaining proposal, declaring the relevant DOJ issuances unconstitutional and ordering the private respondent's re-arraignment. The private respondent pleaded guilty to two counts of Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction. The People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing grave abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing the plea bargain over the prosecution's objection and in declaring the DOJ issuances unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but deleted the portion declaring the DOJ issuances unconstitutional, holding that judges may allow plea bargaining even over the prosecution's objection under certain circumstances and that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ruling on the constitutionality of the DOJ issuances. The Petition: The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assails the Court of Appeals' decision, insisting that the prosecutor's consent is a condition precedent to a valid plea bargain and that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on a subsequent Supreme Court resolution that could not be applied retroactively and did not entirely dispense with the prosecutor's consent.

Issue(s)

Whether the consent of the prosecutor is indispensable to a valid plea bargain in drug cases. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the plea bargain over the prosecution's objection and in declaring the DOJ issuances unconstitutional.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 2019 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The twin pleas of 'guilty' entered by Naci Borras y Lascano to two (2) counts of Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under Section 12 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, and the Decision dated August 31, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Naga City in Criminal Case Nos. 2017-0358 and 2017-0359 are INVALIDATED. The cases are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Naga City for resumption of the proceedings on the original charges of violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640.

Ratio Decidendi

On the indispensability of the prosecutor's consent to a valid plea bargain in drug cases: The Supreme Court held that the consent of the prosecutor to a plea bargain in drug cases is not optional and cannot be disregarded. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states that an accused may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor. The prosecutor, as the representative of the State and the guardian of public interests, has full control over the prosecution and is duty-bound to prosecute the proper offense based on the evidence. The Court reiterated its pronouncements in People v. Villarama, Jr. and Sayre v. Xenos, emphasizing that plea bargaining requires mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to court approval, but the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable as a matter of right. The State, being the offended party in drug cases, must give its consent through the prosecutor. Therefore, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the prosecutor's objection. On the trial court's grave abuse of discretion in allowing the plea bargain and declaring DOJ issuances unconstitutional: The Court found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the prosecutor's vigorous objection to the private respondent's plea bargaining proposal. Since there was no mutual agreement between the parties, the trial court should have ordered the continuation of the proceedings instead of rendering a verdict of conviction based on invalid pleas. Furthermore, while the trial court declared DOJ issuances unconstitutional, the Supreme Court clarified that DOJ Circular No. 027-18 did not repeal or modify the Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and merely served as an internal guideline for prosecutors. The Court of Appeals correctly deleted the portion of the trial court's ruling that declared the DOJ issuances unconstitutional, as the issue of plea bargaining could be resolved by applying A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC without passing on the constitutionality of the DOJ issuances. However, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the conviction due to the fundamental procedural flaw of the invalid plea bargain.

Main Doctrine

The consent of the prosecutor is indispensable to a valid plea bargain in drug cases, and a trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the prosecutor's objection to a plea bargaining proposal.

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