Arambulo v. Court of First Instance of Laguna
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On November 27, 1914, the Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered a judgment in civil case No. 1725, ordering the defendant, Felix Arambulo (petitioner herein), to vacate the land in question. The Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, was the plaintiff in this case. Procedural History: On March 24, 1915, the provincial fiscal, acting for the Municipality of Santa Rosa, filed a motion for a writ of execution of the 1914 judgment. No writ was issued. On May 27, 1929, the provincial fiscal filed a new motion for a writ of execution. The respondent court, through vacation judge Mariano A. Albert, issued an order on May 16, 1929, declaring that the period of prescription had been interrupted by the filing of the March 24, 1915 motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The Petition: Felix Arambulo filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking to annul the May 16, 1929 order of the respondent court.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of a motion for a writ of execution, without further steps to obtain it, interrupts the five-year period for execution of a judgment. Whether the order of May 16, 1929, granting the writ of execution after more than five years from the entry of judgment, is null and void.
Ruling
The Supreme Court declared the order of May 16, 1929, null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the filing of a motion for a writ of execution interrupts the prescriptive period: The Court held that the mere filing of a motion praying for a writ of execution, without taking the necessary steps to obtain said execution, does not interrupt the five-year period fixed by law for the prescription of the execution of a judgment. Section 443 of Act No. 190 provides that a party may "have" a writ of execution within five years after entry. The word "have" implies obtaining or procuring, which involves more than merely praying for it. The law requires active steps to secure the execution within the statutory period. The Court emphasized that the municipality only "prayed for" the execution within the five years but did not take the necessary steps to "obtain" it. On the issue of the validity of the order granting execution after the prescriptive period: Consequently, the order issued on May 16, 1929, granting the petition for a writ of execution, was rendered after the five-year limitation had elapsed. The Court found that the period of prescription had not been interrupted by the motion filed on March 24, 1915, as no further action was taken to pursue the execution. Therefore, the court no longer had jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution fourteen years after the judgment became final. The Court cited Compania General de Tabacos vs. Martinez to support the principle that mere procedural filings, without diligent prosecution, do not suspend limitations.
Main Doctrine
The mere filing of a motion praying for a writ of execution of a judgment, without taking the necessary steps to obtain said execution, does not interrupt the five-year period fixed by law for the prescription of the execution of a judgment. An order granting such a motion, entered after the said period has elapsed, is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.