Malicse-Hilaria v. Reyes
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Ricardo Malicse possessed Lot No. 2816 from 1908 to 1932. His daughter, Castora M. Malicse, gained possession and obtained OCT No. CLOA-370 in her name on December 9, 1992. After Castora's death in 2003, her daughter, petitioner Lucia Malicse-Hilaria (Hilaria), and her siblings took possession. Procedural History: - On August 25, 2017, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) found respondents Ivene D. Reyes, Jonne L. Adaniel, Alvaro B. Nonan, Nilo L. Subong, and Cesar S. Guarino guilty of violating Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service, forfeiture of benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and cancellation of civil service eligibility. - The OMB also found probable cause to indict respondents for violation of Section 3(B) of R.A. No. 3019. - Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). - On September 28, 2018, the CA affirmed the OMB decision but modified it to dismiss the administrative charge against respondent Ivene D. Reyes. - On January 15, 2020, the CA, in its Amended Decision, granted the partial motion for reconsideration of respondents Adaniel, Nonan, Subong, and Guarino, reversing and setting aside the OMB decision and absolving them from administrative liability. - Hilaria filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the CA's Amended Decision. The Petition: Hilaria argued that the CA erred in absolving the respondents, claiming that their denial and alibi were weak defenses against her positive identification, that the respondents conspired to commit solicitation and/or acceptance of gifts, and that the CA should not have tolerated the respondents' alleged wrong mode of appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman and absolving the respondents from administrative liability for violation of Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713. Whether substantial evidence exists to prove that respondents solicited or accepted money in exchange for classifying Lot No. 2816 as alienable and disposable.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Decision dated September 28, 2018 and the Amended Decision dated January 15, 2020 of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the Decision dated August 25, 2017 and the Resolution dated December 1, 2017 of the Office of the Ombudsman finding respondents Ivene D. Reyes, Jonne L. Adaniel, Alvaro B. Nonan, Nilo L. Subong, and Cesar S. Guarino guilty of violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713 and imposing upon them the penalty of dismissal, cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking civil service examinations.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman and absolving the respondents from administrative liability for violation of Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713: The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious and held that the CA erred in its ruling. The Court gave credence to Hilaria's claim that she sought a certification regarding the classification of Lot No. 2816 because respondents Guarino and Nonan informed her that it was classified as timber land. This prompted her to seek a certification from the DENR-PENRO, especially since OCT No. CLOA-370, issued under R.A. No. 6657, indicated that Lot No. 2816 was agricultural land and not timber land. The Court noted the absence of any reversion proceedings concerning Lot No. 2816, further supporting the idea that its classification as timber land was questionable. The Court found the conduct of a second inspection, purportedly to give Hilaria peace of mind, to be incredulous, especially given the verbal request and the prior alleged insult. Furthermore, the respondents failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the discrepancies in their findings regarding the land classification, which shifted from entirely timber land to only 516 sq. m. being alienable and disposable, and then back to a different alienable and disposable area based on DAR's technical description. These unexplained variances lent credence to Hilaria's claim that the respondents were attempting to extract money from her. The Court concluded that the requirement of substantial evidence, defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, had been satisfied in this case, thus the CA erred in reversing the findings of the OMB. On the issue of whether substantial evidence exists to prove that respondents solicited or accepted money in exchange for classifying Lot No. 2816 as alienable and disposable: The Supreme Court affirmed the existence of substantial evidence. Both Hilaria and Vito attested that respondents demanded P500,000.00 in exchange for classifying Lot No. 2816 as alienable and disposable, and prior to this, Guarino and Nonan had asked for P25,000.00 for the site inspection. Although the respondents vehemently denied these allegations, the Court found that the circumstances surrounding the case, including the initial information that the lot was timber land despite the existing OCT No. CLOA-370, the questionable second inspection, and the unexplained discrepancies in the land classification reports, lent credence to Hilaria's claims. The Court emphasized that the elements of Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713, namely that the accused is a public official or employee, solicited or accepted anything of monetary value, and that the act was done in the course of official duties, were sufficiently established by substantial evidence. Consequently, the Court reinstated the OMB's decision imposing the penalty of dismissal from service and its accessory penalties.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court reinstated the Ombudsman's decision finding DENR officials guilty of violating Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 for soliciting and accepting money in exchange for classifying a parcel of land as alienable and disposable, holding that the unexplained discrepancies in land classification findings and the circumstances surrounding the request for a second inspection provided substantial evidence of the violation.